Schaghticoke Indian Tribe


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Colonial History in Killingworth

Killingworth originally comprised present day Killingworth and the Town of Clinton to the south. Killingworth was first settled in 1663 as the plantation of “Homonoscitt” (Hammonasset). Among the regulations for the ordering of the plantation in October 1663 was that there shall be at least thirty families on the east side of the Hammonasset. The 30 lots were laid out along what is Main Street in Clinton on both sides of the Indian River. Then, at a Court of Election held in Hartford on May 9, 1667, it was ordered that “ye towne of Homonoscit shal for ye future be named Kenilworth, & for yr brand of horses they shal have ye letter V on ye near buttock.” On October 10, 1667, the Court gave permission for the inhabitants of Kenilworth “to gather themselves into church order.” In October 1667, a call to be minister was made to the Rev. John Woodbridge, a graduate of Harvard. He was pastor until 1679 when he resigned and became pastor in Wethersfield. Through corruption of spelling, Kenilworth became Killingworth which was used exclusively after 1707.

At the time of settlement, the Native Americans in this region were the Hammonassets who lived along the shore between the Aigicomock, now East River, and the Connecticut River. They were a peaceful tribe and left behind their burial grounds and large mounds of shells. The name of their Sachem was Sebaquaneh or “the man that weeps.” Uncas, Sachem of the Mohegan, married his daughter and came into possession of the lands of the Hammonassets. On the 26th of November, 1669, Uncas, with Joshuah, his son, sold to the inhabitants of Killingworth all the lands in the township, which he had not sold before to George Fenwick, Esq. of Saybrook. They reserved for themselves “Six acres of Land on the Great Hammock.” An Indian village in present Killingworth was located about 0.4 mile north of Route 80 and in the vicinity of the junction of Roast Meat Hill Road and the abandoned Wolf Meadow Road. There are a few rock shelter sites where Indian artifacts have been found.

The town grew slowly at first. In 1686, there were 36 persons (freemen only were counted) living in town and a list of 2412 pounds. By 1706, there were 63 persons and a list of slightly over 3391 pounds. The descendants of many of the original settlers later moved to the northern part of the town. On several occasions, the Town of Saybrook made claims on land in Killingworth. The dispute was finally settled in 1687/8 when 31 Killingworth planters paid Saybrook £30 for “right of soil.” Finally in 1718, a joint committee of the two towns agreed on a straight line dividing the two towns. In October 1703, a patent or act of incorporation was granted by the General Assembly to the proprietors and inhabitants of “Kilinworth” giving them rights to the land and establishing the bounds of the town.

The Rev. Abraham Pierson was called as pastor in 1694. He was highly respected by the townspeople. He also holds the distinction of being the first Rector or president of what was to become Yale College and held the first classes in Killingworth. His house was located in Clinton where the Stanton house now stands. Pierson was one of ten prominent ministers in Connecticut who were named to stand as Trustees or Undertakers to found, erect, and govern a College in the Colony of Connecticut. On October 9, 1701, the General Assembly granted unto the undertakers “full Liberty, Right, and Privilege” to erect and form a Collegiate School. The Trustees then chose the Rev. Mr. Abraham Pierson “to take the Care of Instructing and Governing the Collegiate School; under the Title and Character of RECTOR.” They also chose Saybrook as the most convenient place to “erect and fix the Collegiate School.” They desired the Rector to move to Saybrook but until that could be accomplished ordered that the Scholars should be instructed at or near the Rector’s house in Killingworth. Eight students, some of whom had been studying privately with one or another of the Trustees, were admitted. The first Commencement was held at the house of the Rev. Mr. Thomas Buckingham at Saybrook on September 13, 1702. The Trustees continued in their efforts to remove the Rev. Pierson to Saybrook and offered significant financial inducements. However, the people of Killingworth strongly opposed this so that the students continued to study with the Rev. Pierson in Killingworth until his death in 1707. Mr. Pierson on his deathbed advised those present to select Mr. Jared Eliot, one of his students, as his successor as pastor.

The Rev. Jared Eliot, one of Pierson’s pupils and a graduate of the Collegiate School in 1706, preached for about two years and was called as pastor and ordained on October 26, 1709. He was the son of the Rev. Joseph Eliot, pastor in Guilford, and a grandson of John Eliot, the celebrated apostle to the Indians of New England. He served as minister for 54 years. In addition, he was a distinguished physician and scientist. He was a friend of Benjamin Franklin who visited him occasionally. He was also a botanist and agriculturist, and introduced the white mulberry tree and the silkworm to Connecticut. He operated the iron forge off Ironworks Road in present Killingworth, an important forge in colonial times. He developed a method for making iron from black sand that was located on the shore. He was elected to the Royal Society of London and received a medal from the London Society of Arts.

Settlers began moving into the northern part of town shortly after 1700. Those residents living near the shore were merchants, tradesmen, fishermen, shipbuilders, and sailors, as well as farmers, while those in the north were almost exclusively farmers and referred to themselves as such. The northern residents became concerned because it was very difficult for them to regularly make the trip south to church and town meetings in a time when it was almost mandatory to attend. The northern settlers had to travel five to eight miles on foot, on horseback, or in wagons over poorly maintained muddy roads and the trip was especially difficult in winter. At some point, they decided there was a need to form their own parish or Second Ecclesiastical Society.

In 1734, the northern inhabitants petitioned the General Assembly to form a new society. On May 8, 1735, an Act of Organization was passed by the General Assembly. ”Att a Generall Assembly Holden at Hartford May: 8 : 1[735] An act Dividing the Town of Killingworth in the Coun[ty] of Newlondon into two Distinct Ecclesiastical Societies.” The act stated where the division line would be and made the northern part of town a separate ecclesiastical society. This line would be the boundary between Clinton and Killingworth. The new society is referred to in the records variously as the Second Ecclesiastical Society, North Society, North Parish, or North Killingworth. The ecclesiastical society held responsibility within its boundaries for religious affairs, schools, and the burying grounds.” Property within the limit of a society was taxable, on vote of the society, for the support of the gospels and for the schools.

At the first meeting of the new society in 1735, it was decided to build a meetinghouse. On September 25, 1735 . “it twas voted that it twas necessary to Buld a meeting hous.” A tax was set at a “Rate of a penc half pen[ ] upon ye pound to defrae the Society Charges.” The General Assembly appointed a committee to set the place for the meetinghouse. It reported on May 13, 1736, that they “have pitched upon a place upon a stony hill northerly from the new bridge over the Bare-Swamp brook, where we marked a walnut tree with the letter M, and laid some stones at the root of said staddle, which stands about forty or fifty rods from said bridge.” The report was accepted and approved by the Assembly and “said society is ordered to proceed to build their meeting house upon the place pitched upon by said committee.”

The building, however, became a society house or town hall instead of a meetinghouse as indicated by the following vote. “At a meeting of ye north Society in Killingworth ¼ March : ye 25th : Day AD: 1736 : ¼ it was voted that ye Society hous agreed to be bult Shall be Set up about eight or ten rods northeast from ye place afixed for ye Seting of ye meeting hous.” The society house was 30 feet long and 22 feet wide. It was one story high and had a chimney at one end. This building was built in 1736, but probably because of delays in hiring a minister and establishing a church, and a “misunderstanding” concerning funds due the Second Society from the First Society for building a meetinghouse in the First Society, the building of the meetinghouse was delayed, and it was not until 1743 that the meetinghouse was completed. The society house was used for town and public meetings and stood for a considerable period of time. The site of the society house and meetinghouse is south of the Route 80 and 81 traffic circle and west of Route 81.

The new society established its own church and chose a minister. A committee was formed to learn whether Mr. Samuel Eliot intended to enter the ministry. Samuel Eliot was the eldest son of Jared Eliot and graduated from Yale College in 1735. Sadly, he was in poor health and died at age 26 on a voyage to Africa taken to improve his health. It was then voted to hire Mr. William Seward to preach for several months and in 1737 he was called to be pastor. He was ordained on January 18, 1738 at the meetinghouse in the First Society. The General Assembly gave permission for the formation of a church on May 12, 1737. “Upon the memorial of the north society of Killingsworth: This Assembly grants liberty to the inhabitants of said society to imbody into church estate, with the approbation of their neighboring churches.” Part of the agreement with Mr. Seward was that the Society would provide him with a house. A house 34 feet long and 28 feet wide was built. It was located at the present intersection of Routes 80 and 81. It burned after the Rev. Seward’s death after which the existing center hall colonial house was built on the foundation. This house is now the Killingworth Inn.

After obtaining a minister and establishing the church, the society resumed plans for building a meetinghouse. On November 5, 1739, “it twas voted that we will go about building a meeting house for the worship of God this year _ at the same meeting it was voted that wee will build sd house fifty Eight feet in Length & thurty Eight feet in bredth.” This building was considerably larger than the society house. The meetinghouse was completed in 1743 and was used until 1820 when the second meetinghouse was completed and dedicated.

Present Killingworth did not become fully separated from Clinton as a Town until 1838. At that time, the two societies were nearly equal in population. The formation of the Second Ecclesiastical Society solved the problem of the northern farmers having a more convenient place of worship. However, they still had to travel south to attend town meetings. A compromise was reached whereby town meetings were held alternately in the southern and northern parts of town. This was probably not satisfactory to anyone and it became inevitable that the complete severance of North Killingworth from the southern section would have to take place. In addition, there were political differences. The northern section was strongly Democratic while the southern section was strongly Whig. The town also had a large debt, possibly for educational expenses or maintaining roads in the northern section. The northern residents favored a special tax to cover the debt while the southern residents opposed it. The southerners called for partition while the northerners opposed it. When the split occurred by an act of the Legislature in May, 1838, it was highly favorable to North Killingworth which retained the name Killingworth, the original town records, rights to the town dock and beach, and two representatives to the General Assembly.

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Schaghticoke Tribal Nation Seeks to Regain Rightful Status
By Gale Courey Toensing May 31, 2011
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Schaghticoke central pavilion
Courtesy Schaghticoke Tribal Nation
Russell hired Rost to pile massive stones on and around the tribe’s central pavilion, where meetings and social events take place.

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Richard Velky
Schaghticoke

A superior court judge has ordered a non-Indian man to leave the Schaghticoke Tribal Nation reservation in northwest Connecticut, where he has cut down dozens of trees and has damaged acres of land. In addition to evicting the man, the ruling also settles a long-running dispute over the tribe’s governance and leadership, affirming that the Schaghticoke Tribal Nation, not a faction that calls itself the Schaghticoke Indian Tribe, is the tribe’s legitimate governing authority.

But equally important, says Schaghticoke Tribal Nation Chief Richard Velky, the ruling will help the nation in its campaign to regain federal acknowledgment. That recognition—granted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) on January 29, 2004—was revoked in an unprecedented move by the BIA in 2005, after a relentless 18-month lobbying campaign by Connecticut politicians and the very powerful lobbyist for a group of wealthy anti-casino landowners, Barbour Griffith & Rodgers, and at least a dozen municipalities in the state. Connecticut Federal District Judge Peter Dorsey dismissed the tribe’s appeal of the reversal in 2008, based largely on the fact that he believed federal decision-makers who said they were not affected by the tsunami of political pressure put on them. That political influencing was so blatant and the reversal-process so notorious that one Indian law attorney in Washington recently called it “a shameful example of all that’s wrong with the federal recognition process.”

On April 15, Connecticut Superior Court Judge Corinne L. Klatt evicted Michael Rost from the reservation on Schaghticoke Mountain, where he had been living on and off since 2004. Citing state statutes that regulate state-recognized tribes, Klatt found that the Schaghticoke Indian Tribe (SIT) formally changed its name to Schaghticoke Tribal Nation (STN) in 1991 when the tribe formed a nonprofit corporation and adopted a constitution as part of its petition for federal recognition. “While previously the Schaghticoke tribe had used different formal appellations, with the adoption of this constitution, the name then became the Schaghticoke Tribal Nation,” Klatt wrote.

Rost, in his efforts to stay put, had “vigorously challenged” the STN’s right of control over the reservation, Klatt wrote, but the STN’s evidence established the legitimacy of both the nation and Velky’s leadership. Among the exhibits STN submitted was a letter, dated March 9, 2011, from the state’s Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), which holds Indian land in trust for state-recognized tribes. The letter recognizes Velky as tribal chairman and notes that there have been “no claims or challenges” to his leadership filed according to the required legal process. Judge Klatt wrote, “Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, the court finds that the Schaghticoke Tribal Nation, through its Tribal Council, is the governing authority for the Schaghticoke Tribe.” Rost has appealed the decision.

The lawsuit against Rost was filed by Velky and his distant cousin Alan Russell, who for years has claimed leadership of the SIT, a faction comprising mostly members of Russell’s family—fewer than a dozen people. Russell claimed the chairmanship of the tribe for a short period in the mid 1980s. It was a turbulent time characterized by factional disputes involving allegations of illegal council meetings and fake votes, a lawsuit filed by the tribal council against Russell for unauthorized logging on the reservation and, at one point, two councils. Most of those issues were resolved when the state Freedom of Information Commission upheld the legitimacy of an election in 1985 that ousted Russell, who has continued to claim leadership of SIT regardless of the legal ruling.
Schaghticoke Tribal Nation Chief Richard Velky

Velky has been fighting the BIA and some rogue tribal members.

Despite the ongoing feud, Velky and Russell joined forces in the lawsuit against Rost last summer, both accusing him of destroying land known to contain sensitive archeological sites and stealing Indian artifacts. Velky says he entered the alliance with Russell for the sake of the tribe’s land—the 400-acre reservation is all that remains of 2,500 acres set aside for the tribe in 1736 by the colonial government. “We weren’t looking for Alan to sign up with STN and, obviously, we aren’t ever going to sign up with him. We just wanted to get this guy off the reservation and protect our land,” Velky says.

It was Russell who brought Rost onto the reservation in early 2004 in what appears to have been an act of fury against the Bureau of Indian Affairs decision to grant federal recognition to the 300-plus member STN. It’s not clear exactly when Rost began living on the reservation, but he was often there from early 2004 on.

According to police records, Russell, who lives on the reservation, contracted Rost, who owned a rock quarry in a nearby town, to bring boulders (some weighing five tons) onto the reservation and pile them around the tribe’s community pavilion, where tribal meetings and social events take place, damaging the building and putting children and other tribal members at risk. Both men were arrested in March 2004 and charged with risk of endangerment and criminal mischief. According to police records, Russell told the state police that he and Rost “were making a stone wall around the pavilion, that an artist friend was good at rock design, that in a month they were going to put cement between the rocks and take down the pavilion.”

As a condition of his bond, Russell was ordered to remove the rocks and “not do anything further to interfere with or damage the building.” (The boulders were eventually removed by a contractor overseen by the DEP, but it’s not clear who paid for that work.) The court later dropped charges against Russell, but found Rost guilty of reckless endangerment and disturbing the peace, and ordered him off the reservation for 18 months.

Rost returned to the reservation in 2007 but, after a falling out with Russell, he sided with Russell’s sister Gail Harrison, who claimed she had “deposed” her brother and was now the “chief of SIT,” according to DEP documents. Claiming he was authorized by Harrison to build a pyramid on top of the mountain, Rost began tearing up swaths of soil with bulldozers and other heavy earth-moving equipment, desecrating burial sites in the process. He cut down dozens of trees, gouged out roads near the dens of endangered rattlesnakes—the tribe’s symbolic protector—and lacerated the mountainside, destroying streams and a vernal pool. Throughout this time, the DEP ignored multiple appeals from Velky and STN’s tribal council to issue a cease-and-desist order to protect the reservation land against Rost’s depredations, and the state police refused to act. The agencies based their decision on directions from then Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, who claimed that a “leadership dispute” in the tribe prevented the state from acting on the reservation. Blumenthal, who opposed STN’s federal recognition and then led the political campaign to overturn the BIA’s positive decision, with the support of at least a dozen municipalities in the state, is now a U.S. senator.

It was a frustrating time for the nation, Velky says. “They pretended they couldn’t do anything to stop the destruction because they didn’t know who the tribe’s leader was,” he says.

According to Velky, Russell, through an attorney, invited him to join the lawsuit to oust Rost from the reservation, and the
Schaghticoke Tribal Nation petition

STN’s 40,000-plus-document petition

STN council approved the action. During the court hearing, Harrison told the judge that Rost was renting and living in a converted garage she owns. But only tribal members through their councils have the right to determine who lives on their reservation, according to state law, the judge said, ruling that Rost had no right to occupy the dwelling even if Harrison wanted him there.

Although Russell sought Rost’s eviction, he was not happy with the judge’s finding that STN and Velky are the legitimate governing authority and leader of the Schaghticoke tribe, and vows to challenge the finding. “She made a big mistake by giving Richie that little bit of authority on the reservation because we have paperwork proving otherwise,” says Russell, who failed to show up in court in March when the judge heard testimony and received documents. “He doesn’t have authority here. I’m glad it came out this way. Maybe we can get rid of him once and for all.”

The ruling satisfied Velky, who says the nation will continue its quest to restore its federal acknowledgement although he was not prepared to discuss the steps the council is taking. “What they did to us was attempted cultural genocide,” he says.

Many people agree. Mention STN’s case to almost anyone involved in Indian affairs and they scoff that what happened was a flagrant disregard for a process that’s supposed to be straightforward. “You put in facts, you compare facts to rules and you determine if the facts fit the rules,” says a Washington lobbyist who asked not to be named so as to not jeopardize his relationship with BIA. “Well, they changed the rules after the fact and made it a political process.”

Aurene Martin, a former deputy assistant secretary-Indian affairs who issued the final determination recognizing STN, stands by her decision. “I think it was a good decision. When I made the decision I had the advice of the staff at the Office of Federal Acknowledgement and I felt the Schaghticoke petition was a very strong one, so it was a good decision and I’m sad it got overturned later on,” Martin said recently.

In reversing the recognition, Interior Associate Deputy Secretary James Cason trashed a policy decision made after a deliberative process by former Interior Secretary Gale Norton and the BIA staff that concluded the tribe’s hundreds of years of state recognition merited important consideration as a matter of “constitutional principles of federalism.” Martin maintains that state recognition should be given weight in determining a tribe’s federal status. “I especially think the use of state recognition as evidence of a tribe’s political existence is a completely solid legal basis to make that determination on, and so, yes, I would stand by that decision,” she says.

Martin declined to discuss what happened at the Interior Department regarding the decision to reverse STN’s recognition, but said the recognition process needs to be revised. “I think the regulations have become so set in stone that they fail to account for the vagaries of history.”

Michael Rossetti, Norton’s former general councilor who left Interior a month after STN received federal recognition, said the secretary’s decision should have spoken for itself. “There was a presentation made by career staff to political appointees, including me, and the recommendation [to acknowledge the STN] was made on what we understood to be the career peoples’ comfort level with doing it,” he says. “And recommendations were made up the line consistent with that recommendation. Now, it might have been reversed a year later, but at the time when the decision was made, career people in the department appeared to be comfortable with it,” Rossetti is now at the law firm of Akin Gump.

Most attorneys and lobbyists who deal with Indian affairs will only speak anonymously because of ongoing interactions with the Interior Department. One lawyer who asked not to be named said, “The Schaghticoke decision is the shameful example of all that’s wrong with the recognition process. The tribe put 20 years into answering all the questions it was required to answer only to have the rules change after the last minute to deprive them of their positive finding.”

STN’s appeal pointed out several instances of what it called the BIA’s “capricious and arbitrary” rule changes. In one example, the BIA advised the tribe to encourage un-enrolled members to join STN. In its positive decision recognizing the tribe, the BIA interpreted the un-enrolled members as part of a factional rivalry that provided evidence of continuous community. But in its reversal, the agency said the few members who remained un-enrolled indicated a lack of continuous community.

Several lawyers and lobbyists say that entrenched bureaucrats at Interior have an inordinate amount of power to decide which tribes receive federal acknowledgement.

The good news for tribes—and perhaps the STN—is that the Interior Department appears to be getting the message that the federal recognition process needs an overhaul. George Skibine, Interior deputy assistant secretary-management, said recently that the acknowledgment regulations are being revised. Among the proposed changes are a shortening of the process (STN filed its letter of intent to petition for federal acknowledgement in 1981) and the creation of an independent administrative forum to review petitions before final decisions are rendered. “I think some of the groups that are petitioning feel it’s not a fair process or necessarily impartial,” Skibine said.

It’s not clear if tribes who were denied recognition will have another shot under the revised rules. The Schaghticoke nation is in the unique position of being the only contemporary tribe to have its federal recognition terminated since the end of the termination era in the 1970s.

Velky says he will continue to seek justice for his people. “We followed all the rules, while our opponents were talking to the Interior decision-makers, the governor, the White House, the judge, the Interior Board of Indian Appeals, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. Everyone was having discussions but us. We had to wait to exhaust the process. Now we’re no longer under any court oversight and we’re looking to see what options we have as a tribe that was federally recognized based on the merits of our petition.

“We know it’s not an easy reversal to overcome. But Schaghticoke had the dubious honor of being the first tribe to have its federal recognition reversed by the BIA. We think we’ll set the stage for another, more-positive first—the first tribe to have its recognition restored.”

http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/05/schaghticoke-tribal-nation-seeks-to-regain-rightful-status/

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Supreme Court won’t hear tribe’s case

Updated: Thursday, 07 Oct 2010, 11:22 AM EDT
Published : Thursday, 07 Oct 2010, 11:22 AM EDT

Kent, Conn. (AP) – The leader of the Schaghticoke Tribal Nation in Connecticut says the tribe isn’t giving up its efforts to win federal recognition, even after the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal by the tribe this week.

Chief Richard Velky says the Kent-based Schaghticokes have 25 days to request a rehearing before the nation’s highest court. He also says going to Congress could be a last resort.

The federal Bureau of Indian Affairs granted the tribe recognition in 2004. But that decision was later reversed after state officials argued the tribe had gaps in evidence related to its social continuity and political governance.

A federal appeals court rejected the tribe’s appeal of the recognition reversal last year.

The Schaghticokes have had a state-recognized reservation since the mid-1700s.

Copyright Associated Press, Copyright 2011 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

http://www.wtnh.com/dpp/news/litchfield_cty/kent-supreme-court-wont-hear-tribes-case

Back to the Indian Law Bulletins

Cite as: 2003 WL 21689658 (Conn.)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

SCHAGHTICOKE TRIBAL NATION,

v.

Ronald HARRISON.

Nos. 16874, 16875.

Argued Feb. 11, 2003.

Decided July 29, 2003.

If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause.

Standing doctrine requires a plaintiff to demonstrate two facts: first, the complaining party must be a proper party to request adjudication of the issues; second, the person or persons who prosecute the claim on behalf of the complaining party must have authority to represent the party.

To demonstrate authority to sue, it is not enough for a party merely to show a colorable claim to such authority; rather, the party whose authority is challenged has the burden of convincing the court that the authority exists.

When issues of fact are necessary to the determination of a court’s jurisdiction, due process requires that a trial-like hearing be held, in which an opportunity is provided to present evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

Faction of state-recognized Indian tribe, which sued resident of tribal reservation for trespass in connection with removal of timber from reservation, had burden of convincing court of its right to maintain action on behalf of tribe after resident challenged that faction’s standing to sue on tribe’s behalf, asserting that another faction was the tribe recognized by state. C.G.S.A. § 47-63.

Faction of state-recognized Indian tribe, which sued resident of tribal reservation for trespass in connection with removal of timber from reservation, was entitled to evidentiary hearing on whether it had standing to sue on tribe’s behalf. C.G.S.A. § 47-63.

A decision by federal Bureau of Indian Affairs regarding plaintiff’s pending petition for federal recognition as an Indian tribe was not a prerequisite to determining whether plaintiff, a faction of state-recognized Indian tribe, had standing to bring a state-common law trespass action to protect tribe’s interests in the reservation assigned to tribe under state statute. C.G.S.A. § 47-63.

A decision by federal Bureau of Indian Affairs regarding the plaintiff’s pending petition for federal recognition as an Indian tribe was not an administrative remedy that plaintiff, a faction of state-recognized Indian tribe, was required to exhaust before bringing a state-common law trespass action to protect the interests of state-recognized tribe in the reservation assigned to tribe under state statute; federal recognition of plaintiff’s tribal status would not provide the remedy sought in trespass action. C.G.S.A. § 47-63.

Federal recognition of some American Indian tribes did not, under a theory of preemption, deprive state trial court of jurisdiction to determine whether a faction of state-recognized Indian tribe had standing to bring common-law trespass action to protect tribe’s interests in reservation assigned to tribe under state statute. C.G.S.A. § 47-63.

Allegations in trespass complaint by faction of state-recognized Indian tribe, that faction was an American Indian tribe with a state reservation located in a particular town and that faction had been the owner and had been in possession and uninterrupted use of the land at issue at least since 1987, sufficiently alleged title and possession as facts necessary to maintain action.

Decision whether to grant a motion for the addition of a party to pending legal proceedings rests generally in the sound discretion of the trial court.

Rules of intervention should be liberally construed in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and settle all related controversies in one action. Practice Book 1998, § 9-18.

A proposed intervenor must allege sufficient facts, through the submitted motion and pleadings, if any, in order to make a showing of his or her right to intervene. Practice Book 1998, § 9-18.

Inquiry with respect to a proposed intervention is whether the claims contained in the motion, if true, establish that the proposed intervenor has a direct and immediate interest that will be affected by the judgment. Practice Book 1998, § 9-18.

Denial of motion to intervene in common-law trespass action brought by faction of state-recognized Indian tribe against resident of tribal reservation in connection with removal of timber from reservation was improper, where proposed intervenor alleged in supporting memorandum that it, not the plaintiff faction, was the tribe referred to in state statute recognizing the reservation, that it therefore had the authority to control the reservation, and that all reservation residents were members of proposed intervenor. C.G.S.A. § 47- 63; Practice Book 1998, § 9-18.

Once the question of subject matter jurisdiction has been raised, cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before it can move one further step in the cause, as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction.

Action to enjoin the defendant from, inter alia, trespassing on certain real property located on the Schaghticoke Indian Reservation and from removing or destroying any timber from that real property, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Litchfield, where the court, Cremins, J., denied the motion to intervene filed by the Schaghticoke Indian Tribe; thereafter, the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing and rendered judgment thereon dismissing the action, from which the plaintiff appealed and the defendant cross appealed, and from which the proposed intervenor separately appealed.

Charles D. Ray, with whom were Eric Watt Wiechmann and, on the brief, Vanessa D. Roberts, for the appellant-appellee in Docket No. SC 16874, appellee in Docket No. SC 16875 (plaintiff).

Michael J. Burns, for the appellee-appellant in Docket No. 16874 (defendant) and for the appellant in Docket No. 16875 (proposed intervenor).

SULLIVAN, C.J., and BORDEN, KATZ, PALMER and ZARELLA, Js.

SULLIVAN, C.J.

*1 In these two consolidated appeals, the plaintiff, Schaghticoke Tribal Nation, appeals from the trial court’s decision granting the motion of the defendant, Ronald Harrison, to dismiss the plaintiff’s trespass action, and the defendant cross appeals and the proposed intervenor, the Schaghticoke Indian Tribe, appeals, both from the trial court’s decision denying the proposed intervenor’s motion to intervene. We reverse both the trial court’s granting of the motion to dismiss and its denial of the motion to intervene.

The Schaghticoke are a state-recognized tribe of Indians who possess a state- recognized reservation in Kent. [FN1] The tribe currently is divided into two factions. The plaintiff, Schaghticoke Tribal Nation, and the proposed intervenor, Schaghticoke Indian Tribe, of which the defendant is a member, each claim to be the tribe recognized by the state. On June 13, 2001, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for trespass. The basis of the complaint was an allegation that the defendant, a resident of the Schaghticoke Indian reservation (reservation), without the plaintiff’s permission and contrary to its orders, had removed and was continuing to remove timber from the reservation and had caused additional incidental damage in the process. On July 17, 2001, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action, and the proposed intervenor filed both a motion to intervene and a motion to dismiss. On November 27, 2001, the trial court denied the motion to intervene and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff did not have standing because it did not have authority to bring suit on behalf of the tribe. The plaintiff and the proposed intervenor appealed from these decisions against each of them respectively, and the defendant filed a cross appeal challenging the denial of intervention. We transferred the appeals to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 65-1. We reverse both decisions of the trial court.

I

We first consider the plaintiff’s appeal challenging the trial court’s granting of the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff maintains that the facts alleged in its complaint were sufficient to demonstrate standing and that those facts should have been construed most favorably to the plaintiff. In the alternative, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the motion to dismiss. We agree with the plaintiff’s alternative argument.

[1] [2] [3][4] ” ‘If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause.’ ” Ramos v. Vernon, 254 Conn. at 799, 808, 761 A.2d 705 (2000). “[T]he standing doctrine requires a plaintiff to demonstrate two facts. First, the complaining party must be a proper party to request adjudication of the issues…. Second, the person or persons who prosecute the claim on behalf of the complaining party must have authority to represent the party.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Southbury, 231 Conn. at 563, 571, 651 A.2d 1246 (1995). “To demonstrate authority to sue … it is not enough for a party merely to show a ‘colorable claim’ to such authority. Rather, the party whose authority is challenged has the burden of convincing the court that the authority exists.” Id., at 572, 651 A.2d 1246. “When issues of fact are necessary to the determination of a court’s jurisdiction, due process requires that a trial-like hearing be held, in which an opportunity is provided to present evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Unisys Corp. v. Dept. of Labor, 220 Conn. at 689, 695-96, 600 A.2d 1019 (1991).

*2 [5] [6] In the present case, the defendant challenged the plaintiff’s authority to bring an action on behalf of the Schaghticoke tribe, [FN2] asserting that the proposed intervenor, and not the plaintiff, is the tribe recognized by the state. In the face of this challenge, the plaintiff had the burden of convincing the court of its authority to maintain this action, and, therefore, contrary to its claims, was not entitled to have its allegations regarding this authority construed in its favor. See Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Southbury, supra, 231 Conn. at 572, 651 A.2d 1246. The plaintiff was, however, entitled to an evidentiary hearing at which it could attempt to establish its authority before the court found that it lacked that authority. Because the trial court in this case did not hold an evidentiary hearing prior to determining that the plaintiff was not authorized to bring an action on behalf of the tribe, the court’s granting of the defendant’s motion to dismiss was improper.

The defendant asserts several alternate grounds for affirmance of the court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s action. The defendant maintains that, in the present case, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hold such an evidentiary hearing or to determine whether the plaintiff is in fact the Schaghticoke tribe referred to in General Statutes § 47-63, because the resolution of the question of “tribal status” must be determined in administrative proceedings before the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (bureau) [FN3] before the trial court may permit this case to proceed. We disagree.

The defendant claims that “[a] determination of the tribal status of [the plaintiff] and [the proposed intervenor] is required prior to proceeding” in the present case. Noting the plaintiff’s petition for federal recognition pending with the bureau, the defendant claims that “the determination of tribal status is a prerequisite to determining the merits of the plaintiff’s complaint, and tribal status is also at the heart of the federal proceedings. The plaintiff’s claims are contingent upon the resolution of that very issue, and are not ripe.” The defendant makes no other assertion regarding the status of the plaintiff’s petition for federal recognition and, therefore, takes the position that the mere fact that such a petition is pending, standing alone, deprives the trial court of jurisdiction.

The defendant cites only one case in support of his claim that the present case is not ripe. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51 (2d Cir.1994). That case, however, does not support his position. In Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, supra, at 54, a tribe of Indians sought relief under the federal Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of July 22, 1790 (Nonintercourse Act), 25 U.S.C. § 177, which provides in relevant part: “No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution….” The plaintiff in that case also had an application for recognition pending with the bureau. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, supra, at 55. One of the defendants moved to dismiss the action, claiming that “the [D]istrict [C]ourt lacked jurisdiction because [the] plaintiff had alleged insufficient facts to support an element of its claim, namely that [the] plaintiff is a ‘tribe’ within the meaning of the Nonintercourse Act.” Id. The District Court dismissed the action without prejudice. Id., at 54. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the District Court was required to defer to the bureau’s determination of whether the plaintiff in that case would be granted federal recognition before determining if that plaintiff was a “tribe” under federal law, and remanded the case with direction to stay the action pending that determination by the bureau. Id., at 60.

*3 [7] The plaintiff in the present case has not brought suit under any law requiring that it be a federally recognized tribe, however, but instead has brought a state common-law trespass action to protect the interests of the Schaghticoke tribe in the reservation assigned to it under § 47-63. Therefore, if the plaintiff can establish that it is authorized to bring this action on behalf of the Schaghticoke tribe, the plaintiff has standing whether its petition for federal recognition is granted, denied or stayed indefinitely. Consequently, a decision by the bureau regarding the plaintiff’s pending petition for federal recognition is not a prerequisite to determining the plaintiff’s standing to sue in the present case.

[8] The defendant further asserts that “[t]he question of ripeness in the present case also involves an understanding of the interrelated doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction as well as concerns over federal preemption.” Those doctrines, however, did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hold an evidentiary hearing in the present case to determine if this action has been properly authorized by the Schaghticoke tribe. The plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendant from removing trees from, or making other alterations to, land on the reservation. The granting by the bureau of the plaintiff’s petition for federal recognition would not provide the remedy sought by the plaintiff in this action, and, as previously explained, federal recognition is not a prerequisite for the granting of that remedy. Consequently, the alleged failure by the plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before the bureau did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. Similarly, while the bureau has the authority to determine which, if any, Schaghticoke group will be granted federal recognition, it does not have primary jurisdiction over the issue of whether the plaintiff is in fact the tribe already recognized by the state.

[9] We next consider the defendant’s claim that “[a]rguably, the federal government has preempted the field of determination of tribal status of Native American groups” because “[p]ursuant to [Congressional] authorization, in 1978 the [bureau] promulgated procedures for American Indian tribes to be federally recognized .” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the defendant asserts that federal recognition of some tribes precludes state recognition of additional tribes not recognized by the federal government and, therefore, precludes the trial court from determining whether the plaintiff is in fact the tribe recognized by the state under § 47-63. The defendant has provided no authority to support this claim. This proposition, moreover, is contrary to our holding in Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Southbury, supra, 231 Conn. at 576, 651 A.2d 1246, that a state trial court has jurisdiction to determine whether a party has standing to sue on behalf of a state-recognized tribe. Therefore, we reject this argument.

*4 We conclude that the fact that the plaintiff has petitioned the bureau for federal recognition does not, by itself, [FN4] render the present case not ripe or otherwise not justiciable. We conclude further that, contrary to the defendant’s claim, the record as it presently stands does not establish that the trial court lacks authority to determine whether the plaintiff is the “Schaghticoke” tribe referred to in § 47-63.

[10] Finally, the defendant maintains that the trial court’s dismissal of the action should be affirmed because the plaintiff has failed to allege facts that constitute elements necessary to maintain its trespass action. Specifically, the defendant maintains that the plaintiff has failed to allege that it has title to and possession of the land at issue, and he notes that the plaintiff has not disputed the defendant’s claim that all reservation residents are members of the proposed intervenor. The plaintiff, however, has alleged in its complaint that the “Schaghticoke Tribal Nation (the ‘Tribe’) is an American Indian tribe whose current State reservation is located in Kent” and that “[f]or countless years prior and at least since Chief Velky’s election in 1987, the Tribe has been the owner and has had possession and uninterrupted use of the land [at issue].” Because the plaintiff claims that it is the tribe that owns and has possession and use of the land at issue, it has alleged that it has title to and possession of that land. Therefore, the plaintiff has alleged those facts necessary to maintain this action. We therefore conclude that the trial court improperly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s action.

II

We next consider the claim of the proposed intervenor that the trial court improperly denied its motion to intervene. [FN5] Under Practice Book § 9- 18, “[i]f a person not a party has an interest or title which the judgment will affect, the judicial authority, on its motion, shall direct that person to be made a party.”

[11] [12] [13] [14] “The decision whether to grant a motion for the addition of a party to pending legal proceedings rests generally in the sound discretion of the trial court…. It must be kept in mind, however, that the rules of intervention should be liberally construed, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and settle all related controversies in one action…. A proposed intervenor must allege sufficient facts, through the submitted motion and pleadings, if any, in order to make a showing of his or her right to intervene. The inquiry is whether the claims contained in the motion, if true, establish that the proposed intervenor has a direct and immediate interest that will be affected by the judgment.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Washington Trust Co. v. Smith, 241 Conn. at 734, 747, 699 A.2d 73 (1997).

[15] [16] In its memorandum in support of its motion to intervene, the proposed intervenor alleged that it, not the plaintiff, is the Schaghticoke tribe referred to in § 47-63, that it therefore had the authority under that statute to control the reservation, and that all reservation residents were members of the proposed intervenor. These claims, if true, establish that the proposed intervenor has a direct and immediate interest that would be impaired by a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, because a judgment in favor of the plaintiff necessarily would require a finding that the plaintiff has property rights in the reservation that the proposed intervenor claims the right to control. Therefore, the trial court improperly denied the proposed intervenor’s motion to intervene. [FN6]

*5 The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to deny the motion to dismiss, to grant the motion to intervene and for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

FN1. General Statutes § 47-63 provides in relevant part: “The following terms as used in this chapter, shall have the following meanings: ‘Indian’ means a person who is a member of any of the following tribes [including] … Schaghticoke … ‘reservation’ means [inter alia] … the Schaghticoke reservation in the town of Kent, assigned to the Schaghticoke tribe….”

FN2. As previously noted, the proposed intervenor also filed a motion challenging the plaintiff’s authority to bring an action on behalf of the tribe, but the trial court did not rule on that motion to dismiss.

FN3. The defendant asserts in his brief that “[a] determination of the tribal status of [the plaintiff] and [the proposed intervenor] is required prior to proceeding with any lawsuit involving [the plaintiff’s] claims to any authority over [the] reservation. The federal proceedings currently [under way], involving both the Federal District Court for the District of Connecticut, and the [bureau], Branch of Acknowledgement and Research are addressing these very issues.” (Emphasis added.) The defendant does not explain why any ongoing federal court action might deprive the trial court of the authority to determine whether the plaintiff is the “Schaghticoke” tribe under § 47-63. Indeed, the only authority cited by the defendant in support for his claim that any pending federal action might prevent the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court is a case that held that the District Court for the District of Connecticut should defer any determination of whether a plaintiff was a “tribe” under federal law while that issue was under consideration by the bureau. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51 (2d Cir.1994). We conclude that the defendant has failed to provide any basis for the conclusion that any pending federal court case prevents the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.

FN4. As the defendant has noted, if, on remand, the trial court determines that either the plaintiff or the proposed intervenor is the “Schaghticoke” tribe referred to in § 47-63, the bureau may nonetheless decide that the other faction, and only the other faction, shall be granted federal recognition as a tribe. It is also possible, however, that the bureau will grant federal recognition to the group found by the trial court to be the state-recognized tribe, that it will recognize both groups as a single tribe of uncertain leadership, that it will recognize the groups as two distinct, though historically related, tribes, or that it will recognize neither group as a tribe. Moreover, the defendant has provided no authority for the proposition that the granting of federal recognition to a group of Schaghticoke Indians not previously recognized as a tribe by the state would be in conflict with the continued recognition by the state of a different and additional group of Schaghticoke Indians under § 47-63. We conclude that, in light of the present state of the record in this case, any difficulties that might result from the possible future recognition by the state and federal governments of different Schaghticoke groups are too speculative to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine standing in the present case.

FN5. The proposed intervenor moved to intervene as of right, but requested permissive intervention in the alternative. “Connecticut procedure has not always clearly defined the distinction between permissive intervention and intervention as of right….” (Citation omitted.) Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 60 Conn.App. at 134, 138, 758 A.2d 916 (2000). We find it unnecessary to draw such a distinction in the present case.

FN6. We also note that the trial court should not have ruled on the motion to intervene at all. The motion to intervene and the motion to dismiss were filed on the same day. Once the question of subject matter jurisdiction has been raised, “cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before it can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. at 93, 99, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996). Thus, if the court ruled on the motion to intervene before the motion to dismiss, it violated the “jurisdiction first” rule; if the court ruled on the motion to dismiss first, determining that it lacked jurisdiction over the case, then it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion to intervene. Nonetheless, we address the question, in the interest of judicial economy, because it will necessarily arise on remand.

https://www.narf.org/nill/bulletins/state/documents/schagticoke.html

Supreme Court won’t hear tribe’s case

Updated: Thursday, 07 Oct 2010, 11:22 AM EDT
Published : Thursday, 07 Oct 2010, 11:22 AM EDT

Kent, Conn. (AP) – The leader of the Schaghticoke Tribal Nation in Connecticut says the tribe isn’t giving up its efforts to win federal recognition, even after the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal by the tribe this week.

Chief Richard Velky says the Kent-based Schaghticokes have 25 days to request a rehearing before the nation’s highest court. He also says going to Congress could be a last resort.

The federal Bureau of Indian Affairs granted the tribe recognition in 2004. But that decision was later reversed after state officials argued the tribe had gaps in evidence related to its social continuity and political governance.

A federal appeals court rejected the tribe’s appeal of the recognition reversal last year.

The Schaghticokes have had a state-recognized reservation since the mid-1700s.

Schaghticoke Indian Tribe

General History of the Schaghticoke

The Schaghticoke are a Native American tribe of the Eastern Woodlands consisting of descendants of Mahican (also called “Mohican”, but not to be confused with the Mohegans), Potatuck (or Pootatuck), Weantinock, Tunxis, Podunk, and other people indigenous to what is now Connecticut, New York, and Massachusetts, who amalgamated after encroachment of white settlers on their ancestral lands. Their 400 acre (1.6 km²) reservation is located on the New York/Connecticut border within the boundaries of Kent in Litchfield County, Connecticut running parallel with the Housatonic River.

One of the oldest reservations in North America, reserve land was granted to the Schaghticoke in the year 1736 by the General Assembly of the Colony of Connecticut, 40 years prior to the formation of the United States. The language/ culture base is Algonquian with Iroquois influence. Tribe members trace their heritage to the first sachem, Gideon Mauwee, through his grandson Truman Bradley.

Schaghticoke is pronounced /skæt.ə.kok/ SCAT-uh-coke or /skæt.ə.kk/ SCAT-uh-cook (early colonial spelling: Scaticook) derived from an Algonquian word Pishgoch-ti-goch meaning “Where the river forks.” Schaghticoke (village), New York, between the city of Troy in eastern NY and Bennington, VT, took its name from this tribe.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schaghticoke

Highlights of Colonial and Modern Schaghticoke History

1699 – Schaghticoke were the Tribe first described by Europeans as inhabiting lands in northwestern Connecticut and eastern New York.

1729 – Gideon Mauwee, the first recorded Sachem of the Schaghticoke Tribe, signs deed to large tract of land.

1736 – Schaghticoke population includes approximately100 warriors. General Assembly identifies land on west side of Housatonic River as a Reserve for the Tribe, stipulating that white colonists cannot buy or sell the land.

1740 – Shortly after white settlers established the Town of Kent, Schaghticoke population estimated at 500- 600.

1743 – Moravian missionaries build a church and school at Schaghticoke.

1752 – The General Assembly sets aside a parcel of land to supplement the Tribe’s Reservation.

1774-1776 – Schaghticoke men join the Continental Army, serving as scouts, signal corps, and soldiers in the Revolutionary War.

Mid-1800s – After Tribal overseers sell off much of the Tribe’s land, Reservation dwindles to several hundred mountainous acres and a resident population less than 100.

Early 1900’s – New Milford Power Company builds dam, flooding Tribal burial grounds.

1924 – 26, Connecticut Park and Forest Department assumes responsibility over Reservation from individual overseers.

1937 – United States opens Appalachian Trail on Schaghticoke land.

1941 – State transfers jurisdiction to Welfare Department.

1947 – Tribe files unsuccessful land claim with Indian Claims Commission.

1960-61 – Welfare Department refuses to provide funds to repair tribal members’ homes, instead burns all but two residences on the Reservation.

1973 – Creation of Connecticut Indian Affairs Commission spearheaded by Schaghticoke.

1973 – Schaghticoke Indian (SIT) Tribe forms corporation.

1975 – SIT Nation files claim for Kent School lands in U.S. District Court.

1981 – SIT Nation files Letter of Intent for federal recognition with the BIA.

1986 – The tribe split and the Schaghticoke Tribal Nation (STN) was formed and Richard L. Velky was appointed Chief of STN one year later.

1991 – The STN constitution was revised and the tribe became known as the Schaghticoke Tribal Nation of Kent, Connecticut (STNKC).

1994 – STNKC delivers Federal Recognition Petition to the BIA’s Branch of Acknowledgment and Research.

1997 – BIA deems STNKC petition Ready for Active Consideration.

1998 – New land claims filed in U.S. District Court.

1999 – U.S. District Court refuses to undertake judicial determination of tribal status; STNKC requests reconsideration and fails in a request for resolution through alternative dispute resolution.

2002 – STNKC dealt a setback in recognition effort. BIA rules that STNKC failed to meet two major criteria for federal recognition. The BIA’s decision also determined that the Schaghticoke Indian Tribe (SIT) is the legitimate present-day continuation of the historical Schaghticoke Tribe.

SIT: http://schaghticoketribe.com/

STN: http://www.schaghticoke.com/

Comments from Mickey Roth, SIT Executive Coordinator:

“Schaghticoke Indian Tribe is a Algonquin speaking people known as the Old Ones. During the colonial war for Independence, during the Battle of the Sparrow and the Hawk, the Algonquin (Schaghticoke) fought on the side of George Washington’s colonialist troops against the British. The Iroquois fought on the side of the British against the colonies.

In 1736, all land west of the Housatonic River reserve land was granted to the Schaghticoke by the General Assembly of the Colony of Connecticut, 40 years prior to the formation of the United States in 1776.

We have sat quietly for many years as over seers where appointed and sold off or gave away almost all of our lands with very little restitution.

In 1981 the Schaghticoke Indian Tribe (S.I.T.) filed a petition for federally recognition.

In 1986, the tribe split and the Schaghticoke Tribal Nation of Kent, Connecticut (STNKC) was formed with the support of the state of Connecticut government. Using the identity of SIT, through formation of a nonprofit corporation, in 1991 STNKC filed a new petition for federal recognition that was granted in 2004. However, STNKC members did not live on the reservation and STNKC claims were rejected by the Bureau of Indian Affairs because it did not meet certain community and political authority sections of federal recognition law.

The BIA’s decision determined that the Schaghticoke Indian Tribe (SIT) is the legitimate present-day continuation of the historical Schaghticoke Tribe.

SIT claims will be considered by the federal government when its petitions are complete and reviewed under the acknowledgment regulations.

The SIT is ready to move forward.

http://www.manataka.org/page1466.html

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