Missouri and Illinois June 17, 1996

 

 © BY: cella, and all   ©

 

                              

THE MISSOURI FIFTEEN  

 

 

 

 

 INTRODUCTION The following is a true and accurate account of events that began in Missouri and Illinois on June 17, 1996.

 

      The first thing that should be noted is that all of the public officials and employees of the state of Missouri and Lincoln County, Missouri, with the exception of Missouri Attorney General Jeremiah “J” Nixon, were fraudulently representing themselves in their official capacities, due to the fact that none of these individuals have ever filed or recorded, within 30 of such oaths, with the Missouri Secretary of State, or their offices or positions will be vacated.  Everything that has taken place from June 17, 1996 to the present date, by these individuals, that have been involved with the arrest, trial, conviction and imprisonment of the Missouri 15, are a nullity, and were not only operating fraudulently, but under the color of law, and that all of the actions that have been perpetrated by these imposters, should be overturned and dismissed, with prejudice.  This is a demand that the proper authorities exercise their oath sworn pledge, to uphold the Constitution of the united States of America and the Constitution of the State of  Missouri, and bring to justice all parties involved in this fraud and miscarriage of justice.

 

     This has been an egregious act of fraud and tyranny against these Christian sovereign citizens.  If our Republic, not democracy, is to survive, those individuals, responsible for these horrendous acts against society, must be held accountable for their actions  and deeds, and to serve notice on all public officials, to “do right” or suffer the consequences.    

  

     On June 17, 1996, seventeen sovereign citizens of Missouri and three sovereign citizens of Illinois, were arrested and charged with “Tampering with a judicial official”, To wit: Filing a Lien against Associate Circuit Judge, Patrick S. Flynn, of the 45th Judicial Circuit, Lincoln CountyTroyMissouri, for the purpose of harassing Patrick S. Flynn.

 

     The three sovereign citizens of Illinois, were never legally extradited from Illinois, but were kidnapped by the Missouri Highway Patrol, and with the help of certain law enforcement officials of Illinois , were taken to the Lincoln County, Missouri jail in TroyMissouri. This was a blatant and tyrannical violation of these citizen’s constitutional rights and a violation of their Fourth Amendment, due process rights.

 

     We should have seen a judge or a magistrate within six hours of our arrest, unless the arrest would have occurred on a holiday or a weekend.  We never faced a judge for 21 days or until our preliminary hearing on July 8, 1996.

 

     We were not represented by counsel at our pre-trial conference, which is in violation of Missouri statutes.        

        

     On or about April 5, an order issued by Circuit Judge Fred Rush of the 45th Judicial Circuit, appointing Missouri Attorney General Jeremiah “J” Nixon, as special prosecutor in case number CR-l96-429F.  This was the first of many fraudulent and unconstitutional acts of Judge Rush because under Missouri Statute 56 RSMo, only the governor can appoint a special prosecutor, not a judge.  The special prosecutor, Attorney General Jeremiah “J” Nixon, never made an appearance at either the first or second trials.  The Prosecuting Attorney of Lincoln County, Missouri, G. John Richards, made the application for a special prosecutor but failed to file the request without a cause number, also the complaint without a cause number and a docket without a cause number.

 

     The Missouri Attorney General started an investigation, by using the Missouri State Highway Patrol to investigate a number of common law advocates, who held open to the public, meetings for the purpose of enlightening the general public as to their constitutional rights under the “common law’.  Common Law is the law of the land as stated by the united States Supreme Court, through the years, which is the basis of our united States constitution and the constitution of the state of Missouri.  In an investigative report issued by the Missouri Highway Patrol on April 29, 1996, they stated that, “they were investigating the activities of an INSURRECTION group known as the common Law Courts.  Common Law Courts are Article III courts, which are the only legal courts in the united States.

 

     The Missouri State Highway Patrol interviewed all of those arrested on June 17, 1996, but never once stated that we were the target of an ongoing criminal investigation and through a series of smooth and leading questions, which put together a picture that we were a menace to society because we were trying to educate people as to their common law rights.  What is wrong with this picture?  Since when has it become subversive to hold open forums, in a peaceful assembly, to discuss our God given rights?

 

     By these clandestine investigations, perpetrated by the Missouri Attorney General, the Prosecuting Attorney of Lincoln County, Missouri, and the Lincoln County Circuit Court of Judge Fred Rush, for the purpose of denying citizens of the right to free speech and assembly and to redress government for their misuse of their awesome powers, an action  was put in motion to create a continuing invasion of our constitutional rights, which will become openly visible, due to the fraudulent actions of these public officials, due to their blatant abuse of their power.

 

     Attorney General Jeremiah “J” Nixon made a public statement, in his campaign for re-election in April of 1996 that he was out to get Dennis Logan and the common law advocates and put the common law courts out of business.

 

     In about April 1996 a 12 man, common law jury, was convened in Montgomery CountyMissouri for the purpose of serving Associate Circuit Judge Patrick S. Flynn, that he was in violation of the common law by not allowing Keith Hobbs to represent Amanda Brooke Lenk in Judge Flynn’s traffic court, because Keith Hobbs was not an attorney.  The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that an individual has a right to counsel. It does not state lawyer or attorney.  A layman has not only the right of counsel, but to counsel.  See Memorandum in Common Law, page 9.

        

     The defendants petitioned the Lincoln County court for an Article III court and judge, but were denied.

 

     The Defendants petitioned the Lincoln County court for a Grand Jury presentment  and again were denied, which is in gross violation of Article 5, Bill of Rights, which states, “No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury.  We were again denied our constitutional and due process rights.

 

     On the charges of filing a lien against Judge Patrick S. Flynn, the state of Missouri never did produce a lien, and the defendants repeatedly demanded that a lien be produced, because there was no lien, only a piece of paper with some writing on it, that was never signed, yet the Lincoln County Recorders Office, notarized an unsigned document.  There were three documents, all of which were separate, and had no real meaning by themselves, yet Melba Houston’s, Lincoln County Recorders office, stapled all three documents together, thus changing the entire scenario.  The fifteen peoples names, who were eventually tried for filing a lien, were not on the alleged lien, as admitted later by the prosecution and the court, yet they were charged with filing a lien, and were not present when the alleged lien was illegally filed and recorded.

 

    But the arrest warrant and the complaint stated that  “The Special Prosecuting Attorney of Lincoln County, state of Missouri, charges that the defendants, in violation of Section 565.084 RSMo, committeed the Class C Felony of Tampering with a Judicial officer, punishable upon conviction under Section 558.011.1 (3) and 560.011 RSMo, in that on or about  April 1, 1996, in the County of Lincoln, state of Missouri, the defendants, with the purpose to influence Patrick S. Flynn, a Judicial officer, in the criminal trial  of STATE VS.  AMANDA  BROOKE  LENK, an official proceeding, tampered with a Judicial Officer, by engaging in conduct reasonably calculated to harass Patrick S. Flynn”.  This document was signed by Theodore Bruce, the special prosecutor.  .

 

     How can an alleged special prosecuting attorney also sign the complaint?  The complaint should have been signed by Patrick S. Flynn, but his name never appeared anywhere at anytime on any document.  We were never allowed to face out accuser, which is in violation of the united States Constitution.  At our trial we repeatedly  demanded that Judge Rush present our accuser, but were completely ignored, as though we  didn’t even exist.  Theodore Bruce was an assistant attorney general working directly under Jeremiah “J” Nixon and was the prosecutor.  None of the people from the Missouri Attorney General’s Office, the Lincoln County Prosecutors Office, or the judges, have any first hand knowledge.  This is not only fraud but prosecutorial and judicial  misconduct.

 

     FIRST TRIAL

 

     Rule 24.0l says that at arraignment, there has to be given an indictment or informational before a defendant makes a plea.  No indictment or information was given to the defendants. 

 

     In our preliminary hearing on July 7, 1996, in Associate Judge Rockne Calhoun’s court, we not only objected to the gold fringed Admiralty flag, but that the court had no jurisdiction, because Judge Calhoun had no Oath of Affirmation on file.  Another fraud.

 

     Again on August 8, 1996 in Judge Calhoun’s court, then and only then were we assessed of the charges against us, which was 22 days after our arrest, and to our right to remain silent  and explain the charges against us and our fight to counsel.

 

     Proof of jurisdiction before jurisdiction can be imposed (Sanction Standard vs. Olson 74 SCT 768).  This is not due process of law because all defendants were being tried individually, but at the same time.  If any tribunal finds lack of proof of jurisdiction over defendants, the case must be dismissed.  (Louisville RR vs. Motley 211 US 149  29  SCT 42).

 

     Rights allocation is a formality, where jurisdiction is challenged (HAGANS vs. LaVINE 4015 US 528, AT 533).

 

     There was no Indictment for Felony, just a complaint.  Information was supposed to be filed and presented within 10 days of Preliminary hearing.  Indictment is all that should have been used (Missouri Constitution, Article I, Section 17).

 

     There were no valid Affidavits or Complaints supported by Oath of Affirmation.

 

     Associate Circuit Judge Rockne Calhoun had no jurisdiction to unlawfully conduct the business of the court due to the fact that his Oath of Affirmation was not filed as prescribed by law and had legally vacated his office, thus creating a fraud upon the court and against everyone that was forced to appear before him.

 

     A complaint was never filed by Judge Patrick S. Flynn, so there was no injured party and no witness.  What legal right did the unlawful Special Prosecutor, Theodore Bruce, to sign the complaint?  Was he the alleged victim?  How can an individual be both the victim and the prosecutor?

 

     All of the papers that the defendants received from the Missouri Attorney General’s office and from the Lincoln County Circuit Court of Judge Fred Rush and the Court of Judge Rockne Calhoun, in the beginning of these proceedings, were fraudulent on their face because all of the names were in capital letters, which is a Nom Deguerre, which denotes that a person is deceased, which means that the documents that the defendant’s received, were not them.  It seems that the powers that be, don’t know the living from the dead.  Many times in our court appearances, this was pointed out but to no avail, in fact, we were criticized and ridiculed, humiliated and chastised because we were intelligent enough to point out this fact and bring it to their attention.  Again we were ignored totally, because the court and the prosecution refused to discuss this issue.

 

     It is mandatory for the proper authorities to furnish a copy of the information to defendants, but we were forced to search the courts files and get the information after our arraignment.  Another incident of prosecutorial and judicial misconduct and due Process of Law.

 

     The information filed was for “Tampering with a Judicial Officer”, yet the defendant’s were convicted and sentenced for “Aiding and Abetting or Encouraging”.  The jury verdict was fatally flawed.  This again was judicial and prosecutorial misconduct, thus showing bias and prejudice.  Aiding and Abetting was removed from the RSMo. On January 1, 1967.

 

     The 15 defendants filed a  “Rectum Rogare for Recusal for Cause” against Judge Fred Rush for him to voluntarily recuse himself for bias and prejudice.  Judge Rush adamantly refused to recuse himself, so verified bias and prejudice petitions were filed against him.  If Judge Rush had removed himself, everything would have stopped then and there.  But due to the fact that after being incarcerated for one year, we were granted an appeal bond on July 8, 1997.  The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, reversed and remanded our appeal, thus forcing the defendants to go through the humiliation, expense, and insulting degradation of a second trial in June of 1999.  In our opinion, this was out and out double jeopardy, forced upon the defendant’s by a decadent and corrupt legal and judicial system.

 

     On July 26, 1996, all 15 defendants filed a Title 42 suit against the following:

 

     From Lincoln CountyMissouri

 

        Circuit Court Judge Fred Rush

        Associate Circuit Court Judge Patrick S. Flynn

        Associate Circuit Court Judge Rockne Calhoun

        Lincoln County Prosecuting Attorney G. John Richards

        Lincoln County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney James D, Burlison

        Lincoln County Deputy Sheriff Jerry McClellan

 

   From the state of Missouri

 

        Missouri Attorney General Jeremiah “J” Nixon

        Assistant Attorney General Theodore A. Bruce

        Assistant Attorney General Davis J. Hansen

        Assistant Attorney General Edward R. Ardini Jr.

 

   From the Missouri State Highway Patrol

 

        Corporal Mike A (Bud) Cooper

        Patrolman Mark G. Inman

        John Doe #1 Patrolman badge number 358

        Sergeant Arthur J. Flynn

        Sergeant Richard Johnson

        Corporal Jeffrey N. Vitale

 

   Attorney

 

        Attorney Mary Joe Smith

        See Appendix  “A”

 

    It is the law that anyone that has had legal charges filed against them cannot preside at or be a part of any legal proceedings, yet Judge Fred Rush and the states prosecutors, knowing this, blatantly ignored the law and proceeded to continue their onslaught upon these Christian defendants and when Judge Rush was confronted with this, he perpetrated an egregious lie by denying any knowledge of a federal suit against him, as did the prosecution.  The court proceedings should have ceased then and there, even before the request for Judge Rush to Recuse himself.  What’s wrong with this picture?       

 

   This request was again presented to the court and prosecution on December 2, 1996, the first day of the trial.  Again we were totally ignored.

 

   EXPUNGEMENT

 

     Bias and prejudice were definitely present because Judge Fred Rush had the alleged unsigned liens expunged (Affidavit of Notice of Lien unsigned) on May 9, 1996.

 

     This dog and pony show perpetrated by the Attorney General of Missouri and the Lincoln County judges and Prosecuting Attorney should never have been processed beyond the Lincoln County Recorder’s  Office, due to the fact that Melba Houston’s office was remiss in their duties and broke the law by accepting and then notarizing an unsigned document which had been referred to as the :Lien”.  The ministerial duties of the Recorder of Deeds Office is to accept and record only documents authorized by  Section 59.330 RSMo.  That authority is to record deeds, mortgages, conveyances, deeds of trust, assignments, bonds, covenants,  defeasances, or other instruments of writing, of or concerning and lands and tenements, or goods and chattels, which shall be proved and acknowledged according to law, and authorized to be recorded.

 

     The documents that were illegally recorded by the Recorder of Deeds office were not “authorized by law”.  They do not fall within any of the provisions of Section 59.330 RSMo. Or any of the provisions of Chapter 59 RSMo.

 

     The Recorder of Deeds Office exceeded the authority of the Recorder of Deeds in recording the documents in Book 880 at pages 277.300.

 

     If Melba Houston’s Lincoln County Recorder of Deeds Office, had done their lawful duty and rejected, by not accepting the unlawful and unsigned document that was presented to her office, the events, which took place on June 17, 1996, and ending in the first trial, this debacle, would never have taken place and Judge Rush and the state’s prosecutors, full well knowing that the unlawful and unsigned document, that he had expunged from the record, which had no legal meaning or force  and meant nothing, should have stopped all further proceedings, and that would have been to this fraud and farce, which the court and prosecutors tried to call justice, and the defendant’s wouldn’t have had to endure a  first and then a second trial.

 

      Due to the collusion between the Lincoln County Prosecuting Attorney, G. John Richards, Circuit Court Judge Fred Rush, Associate Circuit Court Judge Patrick S. Flynn, Associate Circuit Court Judge J. Rockne Calhoun, the Attorney General of Missouri, Jeremiah “J” Nixon, and his three assistants, Theodore A. Bruce, David J. Hansen. Edward R. Ardini Jr., and members of the Missouri State Highway Patrol, the 15 Christian sovereign Missouri citizens lives would not have been turned into a nightmare, causing the defendant’s irreparable harm, breaking the defendant’s financially, hurting our families, embarrassing the defendant’s in their communities and making a mockery of true law and order by failing to honor their Canons and Oaths of Office. 

 

      Judge Rush and Judge J. Rockne Calhoun violated the defendant’s first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eight, ninth, tenth, and fourteenth Amendments to the united States Constitution and the Bill of Rights.  These rights were secured  under the constitution  of the united States of America, 1787-1791, including the original Article the thirteenth, 1810-1812, and the constitution of Missouri and the united States of America and Missouri statutes.

 

     There was a minimum of 28 motions presented before the court but were never answered or discussed.  When the defendant’s questioned Judge Rush about this, Judge Rush answered by saying that “he wasn’t going to try to figure this out but would let the upper court straighten this out, thus reneging on his oath sworn Canone to do right.

 

     Affidavits of Truth were never addressed, answered or ruled upon by the court or the states prosecutors and many of the affidavits that were filed are now missing from the case files in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, Missouri.

 

     The defendant’s were never offered a written waiver of counsel to sign which is in violation of Missouri law.

 

     First Amendment right, Judicial notices were never addressed, answered or ruled upon by  the court or the states prosecutors.  There was a minimum of three Judicial notices.

 

     State of Missouri did not appear for post trial hearing and pre-sentencing hearing.  Defaults were filed but not answered by the court or the states prosecutors.

 

     The defendants presented a list of 38 witness’ to be called in our defense.  Twenty eight subpoenas were served but were quashed by Judge Rush, thus denying the defendants their constitutional rights and due process of law.  Among some of the witness’ were people of prominence.  There was one state senator, one state representative, two judges and one sheriff, yet Judge Rush quashed these subpoenas with the statement that “these people could add nothing that would be relevant to our defense.  What is wrong with this picture?

 

     The state brought in some witness’ without notifying the defendant’s, thus preventing the defendants from organizing some kind of a defense.

 

     Not once during the trial, when Judge Rush asked the defendants if we were ready for trial, and we answered that we were not, did he ever acknowledge our reply.  He totally ignored us.

 

     Judge Rush told the defendants that even though we were representing ourselves per se, that we would be held to the same standards as the experienced trial lawyers.  This is in violation of federal rulings, which states, that, “defendants that represent themselves per se, are NOT to be held to the same standards as experienced trial lawyers.  Another violation of the defendants due process rights and displayed yet another example of bias and prejudice.        

 

     During the trial, the defendants many times quoted from the U. S. Constitution, the Missouri Constitution and the bible.  The states prosecutor, Theodore A. Bruce, stated in front of the judge and the spectators, that “the constitution and the bible have no place in this court”.  Judge Rush said nothing.

                              

     The states prosecutor, Theodore A. Bruce, stated to the jury that the defendants “waved the flag and hid behind the bible”.  These defendants were Christian patriots.  What does a Christian do but profess the bible, and what does a patriot do but stand on our constitution’s, which is supposed to be our God giver right?  Theodore A. Bruce held us up to ridicule and degraded our religious and constitutional beliefs.  Are these the actions of judges and prosecutors, who took an oath to uphold our constitutions?  There were no sanctions imposed by the judge on the states prosecutors, and who was going to impose sanctions on the judge?  Yet the state was constantly trying to impose sanctions on several of the defendants, and they were successful several times, in stifling the protests of the defendants.

 

     There were 24 members of the common law grand jury, which convened on March 30, 1996 in St. Clements, Missouri to find Judge Patrick S. Flynn in default of a request that he appear and answer as to why he didn’t let Keith Hobbs represent Amanda Brooke Lenk in her criminal trial, and that Amanda Brooke Lenk’s constitutional rights were violated, but the court did not order a lien to be filed.  The decision was left to Amanda Brooke Lenk and her father Melvin Lenk.  Yet, there were only 15 people arrested and charged with “Tampering with a Judicial Officer.  Was this not selective prosecution, because states Prosecutor Theodore A. Bruce admitted that he was the one who circled the names of those individuals that would be arrested and charged?

 

     Put of the 20 people that were arrested on June 17, 1996, two were released because of probable cause. Three secured the services of a lawyer and were tired separately in July 1997 in ClaytonMissouri.  Their bonds were set at $10,000, while the remaining 15 had their bonds set at $50,000.  What does this show?  You wouldn’t have to stretch your imagination to come up with a bias and prejudice determination, would you?  The three that were tried in ClaytonMissouri received only probation and some community service, yet the other 15 had already been in prison about 8 months trying repeatedly to get our bond reduced and to be able to bond out pending our appeal, but we were ignored as though we didn’t even exist.  When the Court of Appeals, Eastern District, finally allowed us to bond out on $50,000, Judge Rush refused to honor the  order and had to be ordered to comply.  What kind of a picture does this show?  Again extreme bias and prejudice because the states prosecutors and the Lincoln County court were very angry at the 15 defendants because the trial lasted 10 days instead of three or four days that the state wanted, and were also angry at the defendants because we stood up for our God given constitutional rights and didn’t back off.  The court and the prosecution wee livid because the defendants stood up to them and fought as best we could against a stacked deck.  The defendants were convicted even before we were arrested.

 

     At the trial of “The Missouri 15” as we were known, the foreman of the jury was William Hufty, who was elated to Judge Patrick S. Flynn.  Judge Rush continued to run over the defendants in his preconceived “dog and pony show”.  Again the state, in collusion with the court followed down the same path of injustice and reveling in their success, because many times when Judge Rush stomped on the defendants, we could observe the states prosecutors laughing, just as one would do at a “dog and pony show”. None of the defendants were paragons of brilliance or of legal courtroom procedure, but we were not so inept that we couldn’t see or understand the travesty that was unfolding in the Lincoln County courtroom.

 

     Judge Rush gave instructions that the state was to strike ninety (90) names from the Voir Dire jury list and the defendants were to do the final strike of ninety (90) names to get down to the required number of jurors.  The state struck only sixty (60) names and sent the list to the defendants to strike their (90) names, which allowed the state to strike the final thirty (30) names, which gave the state a decided advantage which was in direct violation of the judges order.  By allowing this to happen, Judge Rush broke the rules of professional conduct, his Canons 1,2,3, and thus he failed to be faithful to the law, and failed to uphold the integrity of the court and created an appearance of impropriety. 

 

     During the trial the states prosecutor, Theodore A. Bruce, kept referring to the defendants as being connected to the Montana Freeman, which was a bold faced lie, as none of the defendants had any connection with any organization other than our own common law advocacy group.  We often referred to ourselves as Free Men, which is what our constitution is supposed to have made us all.  Theodore A. Bruce also referred to the defendants as kooks, as being anti-government, subversive, and should be removed from society as being dangerous and taken off of the streets.  Of all of the accusations, the state never produced one shred of evidence to back up their scurrilous attacks upon these defendants.  Of the fifteen defendants, eight were veterans of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam.  I do believe that what we were willing to die for was freedom of speech, the right to free assembly, the right to redress the government and to return to our common law Article III courts.  Theodore A. Bruce or the court, had no legal or moral right to impugn our integrity or our patriotic fervor by trying to be heard, and to bring our legal system and judicial system back to accountability to the people.

           

     In a similar case like ours in Colorado, the case was thrown out, but Missouri doesn’t operate that way.

 

     In Judge Rush’s instructions to the jury he told the jury that the jury was to determine the facts, but that he would determine the law, which is in direct contravention to the past practices and dictates of past chief justices of the united States Supreme Court.  To wit:

 

    

    “The jury has the right to judge both the law as well as the fact in controversy”

 

                                            

John Jay, 1st Chief Justice

                              

U.S, Supreme Court, 1789

 

     “The jury has the right to determine both the law and the facts”

  

                              

Samuel Chase

                              

U.S. Supreme Court Justice

                              

1796, Signer of the Unanimous

                              

Declaration

 

     “The jury has the power to bring a verdict in the teeth of both law and fact”.

 

                              

Oliver Wendell Holmes

                              

U.S. Supreme Court Justice, 1902

 

     “The law itself is on trial quite as much as the cause which is to be decided”.

 

                              

Harlan F. Stone

                              

12th Chief Justice

                              

U.S. Supreme Court, 1941

 

     “The pages of history shine on instances of the jury’s exercise of its prerogative to

disregard instructions, of the judge”.

 

                              

U.S. vs. Dougherty

                              

473 F 2nd, 1113, 1139 (1972)

 

 

     Again the defendants were arrested and charged with “Tampering with a judicial officer” yet, we were convicted of “aiding, abetting, and encouraging.  How can a defendant be charged with one crime and sentenced under another?

 

     We were convicted on December 12, 1996.  Two were sentenced to 7 years and the others received 2 years and all were fined $5,000.  At that time we were not allowed to post bond and given ten days to file an appeal, but were hustled off to jail to await sentencing.  The following day, December 13, 1996, which was on a Friday, the Attorney General of Missouri went down to the Federal Court in St. Louis to expunge the Title 42 suits that the defendants filed previously, for lack of appearance.  Isn’t it strange that the state waited until after we were locked up, and hightailed it into St. Louis, when they knew that the defendants couldn’t stop them, or do anything to continue on with the suits.  That’s what you would call sweeping things under the rug.  The state of Missouri and the Lincoln County Court then felt safe and secure in feeling and knowing that they had successfully abused their power and authority and thought that this action would protect them from any further legal action against them.  How wrong they were because, even though the fat lady hasn’t singing, she is getting ready to warm up.

 

     After our conviction, the bonds should have stayed at $5,000, which would have given us a chance to file an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but by raising our bonds to $50,000, the state of Missouri and the Lincoln County Court made sure that the defendants would be incarcerated for a long period of time before we were granted an appeal bond.  Anybody with any sense and reasoning power, would have to be deaf, dumb, and blind, not to see what the game plan was by the court and the prosecution, and what really made them angry was when the Court of Appeals, Eastern District, reluctantly reversed and remanded our conviction.  The die was then cast for our second trial.  The defendants didn’t lose the legal battle, but we lost the political battle.

 

     While the defendants were incarcerated, people on the outside tried to secure legal help and were turned down because it was, as was stated to them, “a hot potato”, and nobody would touch it because they would have been in disfavor of their colleagues and the bar association.  This we had heard from the grapevine.  The judicial and legal system in Missouri didn’t want anybody to stand up to them and possibly expose their corruptness.

 

     The defendants were incarcerated illegally and sent to various jails because Lincoln County didn’t have the room to house us, and kept there until sentencing.  But we were incarcerated illegally, again, because there was no warrant and no warrant order or commitment order.  Most o the defendants were sent to the Callaway County jail in FultonMissouri.  We demanded the proper commitment papers, but were ignored and denied.

 

     The legislature of Missouri proceeded to pass an unconstitutional Lien Law Bill,.  Missouri constitution, Legislative Department, Article III, Section 40(1).  This was done so as to enable the Missouri Attorney General and Judge Rush to continue their assault on these common law advocates.  The new Lien Law became law around August 28, 1996, which was about five days after Judge Rush lost his jurisdiction in his “dog and pony show trial”.

 

     The defendants wee held in the Callaway County jail until around February 2, 1997 and then were brought to the Lincoln County jail in TroyMissouri, for sentencing.  While there, we decided among ourselves that some of us would seek counsel for the purpose of filing to get an appeal bond and the others would hold off to see how we came out.  So from that time we were scattered in about five different camps and it was very hard for us to communicate to coordinate our efforts in getting bonded out or to try to carry on with our legal work.

 

    

 

     After we were sentenced, on or about February 7, 1997, seven of the defendants sought counsel for the purpose of securing an appeal bond.  The seven secured the services of Attorney Wayne T. Schoenberg.  Mr Schoenberg said that one filing fee would take care of the seven appeals.  In a few days we received notice that our motion for an appeal bond was denied because there was only $50 sent to cover the filing fees and there should have been $50 for each defendant.  We were deliberately let to the slaughter by Mr. Schoenberg, and this matter will be attended to at a later date.  The other defendants did not seek counsel to file for an appeal bond and they were immediately sent to different camps in the DOC.

 

      In Mr. Schoenberg’s motions for an appeal bond, he specifically cited the fact that Judge Rush lost his jurisdiction on August 23, 1996, by not recusing himself and also to the fact that the defendants never signed a waiver of counsel as prescribed by law. The court of Appeals denied our bond request, yet 17 months later the case was reversed and remanded because Judge Rush did not recuse himself, and the very same reason that was denied to us 17 months earlier with Mr. Schoenbergs motions for appeal bonds.  What is wrong with this scenario?  This smells of fraud and collusion between the Lincoln County court, the Court of Appeals and Mr. Schoenberg.

 

     In the following months there was a never ending effort, by thirteen of the fifteen prisoners to get an appeal bond and put us in a position to be able to work together to present an adequate appeal, but this was denied us.  We were finally able to get bonded out in November and December of 1997.

 

     Fourteen of the fifteen defendants filed their appeals in the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District,  In April, 1998, oral arguments were heard.  On July 7, 1998, an opinion was filed by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, which ended by stating.

 

        ‘We are constrained to find plain error rising to the level of manifest justice because the trial judge refused to recuse himself pursuant to a timely motion.  Therefore, he was without jurisdiction to proceed further other than to transfer the case.  MONTJOY 831 S.W. 2d at 243.  In light of our disposition of this point on appeal, we will not address defendants remaining points of appeal.  The judgments are reversed and remanded.

 

                              

Paul J. Simon, Judge

 

Robert G. Dowd Jr., P.J. and

Mary K. Hoff., concur.

 

     In reading the whole decision by the Court of Appeals it is as plain as the nose on your face that they agonized in rendering the decision that they did, because you could read between the lines that they would have liked to deny our appeal, but Judge Rush put them in an untenable position and they wormed out as easy as possible, because some of the other points that the defendants submitted to the court were more damaging than Judge Rush’s refusal to recuse himself, but the Court didn’t have the guts to play by the rules and by making the decision, without prejudice, our fate was sealed for a second trial.

 

     But 17 months earlier, this same court refused to halt the proceedings when the very same motion was made.  I defy anyone, in the legal or the judicia, to try and explain this fraud and gross injustice, which made a mockery of the legal and judicial system, and today they are all sitting back and smiling to themselves, but little do they know what is going to come down.

 

     In November, 1998, Judge Glenn Norton from Ralls County was appointed by the Missouri Supreme Court to again start proceedings against 14 or the original 15 defendants.  We were notified by the clerk of the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, that we were to appear before Judge Norton on December 21, in the Lincoln County Court for a pre-trial conference in the State of Missouri vs. Andrew Cella etal. Case # Cr. 196-530FX.  Little did we know that the nightmare that we endured in our first trial and incarceration would be greatly overshadowed by what was to follow.

 

     It is noted that Judge Glenn Norton, was fraudulently representing himself as a judge, because Mr. Norton, had never filed an Oath of Affirmation, as prescribed by law.

 

     To begin with, the alleged Judge Norton was scheduled to retry case #Cr196-530FX, but case # CR 196-530FX did not legally exist because case # Cr196-530FX was assigned by Judge Rush after Judge Rush legally lost his jurisdiction of his court over these defendants, and everything that Judge Rush did after August 23, 1996 was null and void on its face and also Judge Rush did not have his Oath of Affirmation filed as prescribed by Missouri Law with the Secretary of State.

 

     Everything that Judge Glenn Norton did from December 21, 1999 was also null and void because of not filing and recording his Oath of Affirmation.

 

     The following is just some of the most important highlights due to the fact that there are too many documents  to note and the second trial is just a mirror of the first trial with some exceptions.

 

     From December 21, 1998 until the trial began on June 6, 1999, a series of court appearances occurred.

 

     At the opening of the first court date that the proceedings commenced under protest, because the defendants informed the Judge that we were being put in Double Jeopardy by the court and the state prosecutors.  The court and the prosecution were notified that the defendants had a motion before the court for dismissal because of Double Jeopardy.  This was done after the jury was impaneled and sworn.  The defendants were not only denied, but the court and the prosecution as though we had created a great affrontry against the court , and we could tell by the courts attitude that we had gotten off on the wrong foot by exercising our constitutional rights.  We did everything proper by the law, yet we were put under the gun because, we again, stood up to the court and the prosecution.  We knew then, that this was going to be a long, hard road, and it turned out to be just that, and then some.

 

     Again, at our pre-trial conference, we were not represented by counsel.

 

     On December 15, 1998, the defendants filed a Writ of Prohibition with the Missouri Supreme Court.

 

     On February 8, 1999, the defendants files a “Demand for Appearance of the Special Prosecuting Attorney(The l937 case of STATE V. HUETT, 104 SW2d 252.  Remember from the first trial, Attorney General Jeremiah “J” Nixon had been appointed as the special prosecutor in the states case, State of Missouri vs. Andrew Cella etal. Case # Cr196-530FX.

 

     In State vs. Huett, the Supreme Court quotes 1929 Mo. St, Ann, Section 11273 which is identical today at RSMo. 27.030.  An instruction to be gleaned here is that the statute requires a request, order or “direction” from the governor to authorize the attorney general or any of his assistants to act in AID of any prosecuting or circuit attorney etc.  A lesson is revealed inferentially which tells that neither the attorney general himself nor any of his assistants may act in Aid” of any prosecuting or circuit attorney until “directed” so to do by the governor.  As applied in both the first trial conducted by Circuit Court Judge Fred Rush and the second trial conducted by Circuit Judge Glenn Norton, as applied in both cases, there is nothing in the record which even hints toward a governors request.  The facts plainly emblazoned in this case, show an entirely opposite approach, was pursued.

 

     On February 8, 1999 the defendants filed a “Demand for Preliminary Hearing. ALTERNATE, Demand for Indictment, which states in essence that the alleged defendants remind the court that the illegally appointed “Special Prosecuting Attorney”, for Lincoln County, has  “never made an appearance in this case”.

 

     That the failure of appearance of the “Special Prosecuting Attorney” did occur before the original “Complaint” that was filed on June 17, 1996

 

     After the assignment of an Associate Circuit Court Judge, which was Judge J. Rockne Calhoun, on June 18, 1996, a so called preliminary hearing, was held on July 7, 1996, but the record plainly reveals that the “Special Prosecuting Attorney”, did not attend.  Accordingly it must be held that no form of a legal preliminary hearing was held.  Also due to the fact that Judge Calhoun also, did not have his Oath of Affirmation filed and recorded.

 

     Therefore the defendants demanded that a true and lawful preliminary hearing be held if the state elects to pursue the “Complaint”, the “Preliminary Hearing” and the “Information”.

 

     These alleged defendants contend that the heretofore, employed mode of criminal procedure as by way of a prosecuting attorney’s “Information” was rendered unconstitutional because of actions done by the Missouri General Assembly in 1901.

 

     Therefore: These alleged defendants enter their demand for an indictment from the people of the county.  This demand was ignored.

 

     On February 8, 1999, a motion was filed to “Demand the Accuser be identified”.  The same demand was filed in the first trial, but to no avail, because in the first trial the complaint was signed by the imposter, Theodore A. Bruce, because Theodore A. Bruce had never filed his Oath of Affirmation and was legally not the “Special Prosecuting Attorney”.  STATE V. HUETT.

 

     Also filed on February 8, 1999, was a  “Historical Brief: Principles and Accessories”.

 

     Mo, Sup. 1916.  When Missouri came into the union, under its first Constitution, it brought with it the common law, which it had adopted as a territory in 1816-ELKS INVESTMENT CO, v. JONES 187 SW 71.

 

1.   Within the law of Missouri, the common law was adopted as “the rule of action and decision”, while still a territory, and became the foundation for the law of the state (RSMo. Sec. 1.010).

 

2.   In a piecemeal sense, fragments of the aid and abet was codified in the 1825 RSMo.  But these did not adopt a whole of the principles and accessories concept.

 

3.   In 1835, the fundamental text of the principal and accessory concept was defined as a substantive offense and a mode of procedure  relating to accessories was authorized.  In 1845, the procedural mode was amended to authorize proceedings against accessories in the absence of the principal.  This was a substantial departure from the common law pattern.  The text of the sections as codified, concerning principals and accessories and procedure remained unchanged on the books for over 130 years.

 

4.   In the 1879 RSMo., the various sections relating to principals and accessories and procedure, were codified into a single chapter titled “Miscellaneous Provisions and Matter of Practice”.

 

5.   In the 1969 RSMo., Section 556.170, the liability of an accessory to a felony was a substantive offense distinct from that of the principal felon.  The mode of procedure as against accessories appears at Section 556.190.  Both sections were repealed upon the enactment of the new criminal code, Laws, P 658, S.B. 60.

 

6.   In the new criminal code the nearest approach to the repealed Section 556.170 is 

Is 1994 RSMo., Section 562.041, which does not define a separate substantive offense.

 

7.   Under the common law (Lex non scripta), an accessory or aider and abettor                could  not be tried in the absence of a conviction of the principal.  The rationale is that the principal is the only one who actually commits the crime and it must be proved that the crime was actually committed before the accessories could be held accountable for aiding and abetting that crime.

 

This common law rule  (above) is avoided where a statute provides that an accessory may be indicted as a principal.  In the Missouri statutes the nearest approach to abolishing the distinction between principals and accessories was last published in the 1969 RSMo., at Section 556.170. That section did not expressly abolish the distinction, yet it did not authorize a procedural mode whereby accessories may be charged, tried, convicted and punished in the same manner as the actual principal.  This section was repealed effective 1 January, 1979.  Since 1979 there has been no statute (or rule of court), which authorizes that an accessory or accomplice may be charged and tried as a principal.

 

THEREFORE: (conclusion #1).  The procedural mode which was utilized in the Missouri 15 original defendants in the first trial) case, whereby all the defendants were charged as principals in the first degree, but were by instructions and verdict “convicted” as accessories only, is totally flawed.  The  verdict as returned impliedly acquitted all of the defendants of the charges as charged, and then further yielded a “conviction” which is not authorized by law.

 

8.   The 1845 amendment was carried on the books and became 1969 RSMo. Section 556.190, which authorized than an accessory may be indicted, tried, and punished, even though the principal felon is not arrested, tried and convicted.  The effect of this section was to overturn the common law rule as stated in the first sentence of point #7 and #8 above.  The result was that a criminal proceeding could be pursued against any or all accessories independently of any principal in the first degree.  This section was repealed effective 1 January, 1979.  Since 1979 there has been no statute (or rule of court) which authorizes that a criminal proceeding may be pursued against individuals who have not themselves committed the crime alleged.

 

THEREFORE; (conclusion #2) In regard, the Missouri 15 defendants, were, unlawfully charged in the first instance.  The reason being was that that there was no authority for the mode of procedure as utilized.

 

     RSMo. Section 556.170, Accessories defined- Every person who shall be a principal in the second degree in the commission of any felony, or who shall be an accessory to any murder or other felony before the fact, shall upon conviction, be adjudged guilty of the offense in the same degree, and may be charged, tried, convicted and punished in the same manner as the principal in the first degree.  (RSMo. 1939 Section 4839) Prior revisions; 1929 Section 4446; 1919 Section 3687; 1909 Section 4898; Repealed effective 1 January, 1979.

 

NOTE; Common Law rule of procedure when interdicted or abrogated by statute does not revert and implement the common law mode(s) of procedure when the statutory alterations(s) of common law procedural methods (or principals) abrogate and obliterate the altered procedures only:  The common law itself is not altered by statutory abrogation(s) of common law procedural modes. (Pay attention to this historical brief, because this goes a long way in proving judicial and prosecutorial misconduct, deprivation of our constitutional rights, loss of due process, bias and prejudice of the court and prosecution, fraud on its face and a possible RICO Act violation.

 

A “Rectum Rogare for Recusal” for Judge Glenn Norton t recuse himself was filed on February 8, 1999.  Since Judge Glenn Norton did not file or record his Oath of Affirmation, did, vacate his position t sit on the bench and therefore was committing a fraud on the court and the defendants in case #CR196-530FX.  The alleged defendants appeared before Judge Norton,s court for special appearance only, to invoke secured rights under the constitution of the united States of America, 1787, Treaty of the Bill of Rights, 1789 and the Missouri Constitution.  Judge Norton, not only refused to discuss this matter, but vehemently and emphatically refused to comply.

 

On February 11, 1999, a “Notice of Hearing” was filed to provide the alleged Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln County, Missouri, Mr. Jeremiah “J” Nixon, that the below listed title subjects, will be called for hearing before the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, Missouri on February 22, 1999.  All of the below listed titled subjects have been previously served on you.

 

 

1.   Demand for Appearance of Special Prosecuting Attorney.

2.   Demand for Preliminary Hearing, ALTERNATE, Demand for Indictment.

3.   Demand the Accuser be Identified (on individual “defendant” basis).

4.   Objection to “States” Motions and Hearings.                

 

     On February 22, 1999, in the Circuit Court, Lincoln County, Missouri a “Notice to Court”, informing the court that the “Notice of Hearing” had been served upon the Special Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln County, Missouri, Jeremiah “J” Nixon by hand delivery to the Jefferson City Postal Office (65201) by a certificate of mailing on February 12, 1999, upon the attached “Notice of Hearing”.  The said Special Prosecuting Attorney has not as yet appeared in this above stated cause, nor did he appear this day, for the hearings as noticed.

 

     On March 3, 1999 a “Demand that UNAUTHORIZED Attorneys be ejected”, was filed in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, Missouri.

 

     The “defendants” (alleged), by special appearance only, in the above styled cause hereby enter a formal and continuing objection to the continuing nonfeasance and malfeasance and fraud, being perpetrated before this court in the form of unauthorized lawyers, who are acting in usurpation of the office of the Special Prosecuting attorney for Lincoln CountyMissouri.

 

        1. The statutes RSMo. 56.090 expressly prohibit unauthorized persons from acting to “prosecute any criminal proceedings”.                 

       

         RSMo. Must be present.  No judge shall allow the case alluded t in Sections 56.060 and 56.080 to be tried before him, unless the prosecuting attorney or someone properly qualified to prosecute for him is present.  (since none of the alleged state prosecutors had ever filed or recorded their Oath of Affirmation, they were, by law, unqualified to prosecute)  The judge, before trying these cases, shall give due notice to the prosecuting attorney.  (RSMo. 1938, Section 12946, A.L. 1949 HB 2014, A.L. 1959 SB 67, A.L. 1978 HB 1634).  Prior revisions 1929, Section 11320; 1919 Section 740, 1909 Section 1010 effective 1-2-79

 

        See e.q. STATE v. HARRINGTON (Mo Banc 1976) 534 SW 2d 44 and STATE v. JONES  (Mo. Sup 1924) 268 SW 83.

 

     While it is said that the courts of “justice” is blind, this court, now having this matter before it, and within its “sight”, cannot now return to a blind-eye condition.

 

     Accordingly:  This has a duty to eject the unlawful and interfering lawyers and to refuse their further participation. Judge Glenn Norton refused to honor his Canons and to allow this “dog and pony show” trial, to continue, thus causing these defendants much anguish and suffering, not only on the defendants, but on their families.

 

     Also, on March 3, 1999 an “Application for a Change of Judge” was filed in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, Missouri.

 

1.     At an “arraignment”, held on 22 of  February, 1999, Judge Norton stated that the defendants have ten days to file for a change of judge.  Such provision comports with Rule 32.07 (b).

 

2.     Judge Glenn Norton, while he himself was sitting on the bench , fraudulently, illegally and unconstitutionally, demonstrated a partiality in favor of a fraudulent prosecution and directly in conflict with RSMo 56.090, which was noted in the previous paragraph.

 

    Also on March 3, 1999 a “Notice of Hearing #2 was filed in the Circuit Court, Lincoln CountyMissouri.  This notice is identical to the notice that was filed on February 11, 1999, with the exception of two additional notices, To Wit:

 

1.   Application for change of judge

2.   Demand that unauthorized attorney’s be ejected.

 

 

     Again, Judge Norton flagrantly violated his Canons by refusing to take the appropriate action because he was operating just as fraudulently as the prosecutors.

 

     Again, a “Second Notice to the Court” was filed in the Circuit Court, Lincoln CountyMissouri, that the said Special Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln CountyMissouri, has not as yet appeared in this above stated cause, nor did he appear, this day, for the hearings as noticed.

 

Again, Judge Glenn Norton failed to take any action and ignored the alleged defendants as though they didn’t exist.

 

     On March 22, 1999, a “Motion to Compel Production of Discovery”, or in the alternative to impose sanctions was filed in the Circuit Court, Lincoln CountyMissouri

    

     It should be noted here that there has been an ongoing struggle to compel the state to produce all “Discovery”.  This untenable situation continued to the end of the second trial.  The defendants never did receive all of the discovery, that was promised to the defendants.  To Wit:

                      

     A copy of all video tapes that were made in the investigation, including, but not limited to all tapes that were made by undercover Missouri Highway Patrol officers or agents posing as patriotic constitutionalists and filming “common law meetings” (which was a violation of the defendants 1st Amendment rights, which is the right to assemble) or other informational public or private meetings or any other video tape recordings made by the investigating officers or seized by the investigating officers (including, but not limited to those tapes seized pursuant to a Warrant on Alice Jean Logan, on June 17, 1996 at 11:10 P.M.) or are in the possession of the Missouri State Highway Patrol or the Attorney Generals Office or any other investigative unit of the state.

 

 

(It should be noted here that all of the common law informational meetings were open to the public and all participants were welcomed.  There were no dues and the only money that changed hands was to pay for the books that were offered for sale, at cost, and to take up a collection to pay for the buildings that we used.  All newcomers were asked what their job classifications were, so that we could get a cross spectrum of who was interested in what we had to say, and regardless of what they told us, they were still welcome.  But the Missouri State Highway Patrol officers lied about their true identity and were engaged in covert operations for the purpose of gathering information.  But the sad part of all this, is that some of the investigating officers lied in their reports to their superiors to try and make it sound as if we were subversives.  These Gestapo type activities that were perpetrated against good and decent patriotic citizens, who were assembling for the purpose of educating the public as to what the “common law” is, and to discuss current affairs about subjects that were of deep concern to the assembly, mainly the erosion of our constitutional rights and the oppressive measures that were being put into motion by government agencies, to suppress citizens rights to free speech and assembly. Of all of the lies and accusations fomented by the Missouri Attorney Generals Office and the Missouri State Highway Patrol, they were unable to produce one shred or iota of evidence that could remotely show that these common law advocates, were involved in any clandestine or subversive activities, or were connected, in any way, to any other organization or group.  This was a series of scurrilous lies and misrepresentations in order for the Missouri Attorney General, Jeremiah “J” Nixon to give himself exposure and to keep his name before the public because he was seeking reelection to his current position)

 

     There were ten other requests in this document for a variety of information, but itemizing this information, isn’t necessary at this time.

 

     As of March 22, 1999, the prosecution had failed to comply with this request.  Again, Judge Glenn Norton blatantly ignored the defendants due process of law.

 

     On March 22, 1999, a “Motion to Suppress Statements” was filed in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, Missouri by Christine Sullivan, Public Defender for Ima Deana Conklin, one of the Missouri 15 defendants.  We don’t believe that enumerating all of the violations is necessary because the document is on file.  The public defender stated that “any alleged statements are the result of an unlawful arrest in violation of the defendants rights under the fourth and fifth Amendments to the Federal Constitution and Article 1, Section 15 of the Missouri Constitution.  Most of the other defendants had filed “Affidavits of Truth” relating to the violations in this document, but were too numerous to itemize each document individually, except to state that while the defendants in Case #Cr196-530FX were being investigated and interrogated by the Missouri State Highway Patrol, many violations of these defendants rights were perpetrated against them by the Missouri Highway Patrol.  As of this date, there is still discovery material that has never been produced.

 

     On April 9, 1996, a “Petition/Motion to Suppress” was filed in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, Missouri

 

    Now before the court for special appearance only, to invoke secured rights under the Constitution of the united States of America 1781-1789, Treaty of the Bill of Rights 1789-1791, and the Missouri Constitution, the alleged defendant, Andrew James, Cella, makes the following statement.

 

     “On April 24, 1996, Missouri State Highway Patrol troopers W.T. Cooper and MG. Inman called me from St. Louis and said that they were on their way back to Jefferson City and asked if they could stop at my home, under the pretense of clearing up some details in regards to an incident which occurred in Montgomery City, Missouri at the home of Missouri State Highway Patrol Sergeant, Phillip L. Ahern.  In early April, Sergeant Ahern threatened to shoot Andrew James, Cella and Dennis Patrick Logan, if we didn’t get off of his property.  Mr. Cella and Mr. Logan went to Sergeant Ahern’s home to deliver some papers to him from Mr. Keith Hobbs, who at a later date became one of the Missouri 15, and that’s when Sergeant Ahern became very angry and threatened us.  We were doing someone a favor and there was no earthly reason for Sergeant Ahern to act in this manner.  To continue on with officers Cooper and Inman, we discussed this incident for about one half to three quarters of an hour.  Then very smoothly officer Cooper changed the subject by saying “for our own curiosity could you tell us a little of the common law and the common law lien that was supposedly filed against Judge Patrick S. Flynn.

 

    After a period of conversation on the common law and the common law lien, Sergeant Cooper asked me what the purpose of the “alleged” lien was.  I answered by telling him that “I had no personal interest in the alleged lien but merely informed officers Cooper and Inman that through the common law system, the members of the 24 man  Common Law jury determined that Judge Patrick S. Flynn was in “Default” of an Order for him to appear and explain why he violated Amanda Brooke Lenk’s constitutional rights, by not permitting Keith Hobbs to represent her in Judge Flynn’s traffic court on two traffic citations.  I informed officers Cooper and Inman that the members of the Common Law Grand Jury, had nothing to do with the filing of the lien, and that our names did not appear on the alleged lien document, and had nothing to do with the construction or delivery of the document, but merely as the common law permits citizens to exercise their rights to an opinion and to redress any government official.  After some more discussion, I asked officers Cooper and Inman, regarding Sergeant Ahern’s threat to shoot me and Mr. Logan, that if I was driving down the road, and they were on road patrol and pulled me over for some reason or another, and that if I threatened to shoot them, what would they do?  Officer Cooper answered by saying that “they would have either shot me or arrested me”.  After a little more discussion, officer Cooper read back to me what he said that he had written down.  Officer Cooper never let me see what he wrote down or asked me to sign the paper.  He could have read anything that he wanted, and then changed everything around when he made his final report.  I will never know, except later on, after we were arrested, and during the trial, when officers Cooper and Inman were on the witness stand, what they said that I had said, is not what I said in the interview.  Officer Cooper said that I stated that the lien was a “wake up call” to Judge Flynn, which was a scurrilous lie because I never used that term in my life.  Also, when officers Cooper and Inman entered my home under false pretenses, they never mentioned that their visit was part of an ongoing investigation by the Missouri State Highway Patrol, and that the statement would be used against me at a later date.  The actions by the Missouri State Highway Patrol, was entrapment at its best.  I answered them in good faith, because I didn’t have anything to hide, only to have them abuse the hospitality of my home.  The German Gestapo and the Russian KGB were never better.  They and the entire Missouri State Highway Patrol should hang their heads in shame for abusing their authority and trampling on a citize’s rights.

 

     At no time during the said questioning did officers Cooper or Inman say anything about a “Miranda warning”, but it became abundantly clear, at a later date, that they were conducting an investigation, that had focused on Andrew James, Cella as a potential defendant in this political matter.

 

     Te failure of a “Miranda warning”, brings the matter, that was discussed in the interview, within the rule of the suppression doctrine, as created by the united States Supreme Court.

 

     Whether or not Andrew James, Cella’s name appears on a signature list, is not in itself an indication of any criminal activity, any more than signing a voter or hotel registration card might be.  Criminal justice demands that the government, seeking to punish an individual. To produce the evidence used against him, by its own independent labors, rather than by simply compelling it from the mouth of the defendant.

 

     We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a system of criminal law enforcement, which comes to depend on the “confession, will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses, than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skilled investigation.  Our Treaty of the Bill of Rights, 1789-1791, strikes the balance in favor of the right against self-incrimination.

 

     When officers Cooper and Inman approached Andrew James, Cella in Montgomery CityMissouri, no “Miranda” warning was administered in any form, and once officers Cooper acquired a name, it was no longer a general inquiry, but had begun to focus on this particular individual as a suspect.  This is a violation of Article the Seventh, of the Treaty of the Bill of Rights, 1789-1791, as made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, and thereby renders, any information garnered , inadmissible in a state criminal trial, and any incriminating information elicited by the investigating officers, during an unlawfully conducted investigation.

 

     No system of criminal justice, can or should survive, if it comes to depend, for its continued effectiveness, on the citizens abdication through unawareness of their rights, under the Treaty of the Bill of Rights, 1789-1791.  For officers Cooper and Inman to state that they just “wanted to talk”, and then when Mr. Cella agreed to talk, did, deliberately and covertly, convert a supposedly general conversation, about a specific subject, into an oral confession, is precisely the type of abuse the suppression doctrine was tailored to prevent.  (Note: When Cooper and Inman elicited the information that they cleverly maneuvered to procure, they didn’t even have the moral turpitude to report the conversation truthfully.  Shame on them and the Missouri State Highway Patrol).  The Supreme Court of OREGON  v. ELSTAD (U.S. 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1293, 84 L.Ed 2d (1985), held that the First Amendment obtained before a Miranda warning had been given, had to be suppressed.

 

     In WONG SUN v. UNITED STATES (371, 83 S Ct 407, 9 L.Ed 2d 441 (1973), the Supreme Court held that not only the evidence obtained through such means as used against the people and the Treaty of the Bill of Rights, in this police conduct, must be suppressed, but also, that the fruits of the illegally obtained evidence, must be suppressed.

 

     Should the judicial system, support the process, by not suppressing, and thereby continue to allow harvest of the fruit from the poisonous tree, then the citizenry must fear prosecution for signing or saying anything.  This decision, should not be difficult, or a lingering one, for it has been previously decided by the Supreme Court of the united States as indicated above.

 

     WHEREFORE; Testimony by officers Cooper and Inman, as might be used by the state, relating to the above said investigation, and the police report therein, should be repressed, stricken and disallowed,

 

     This document was served on all parties by hand delivery to the receptionist of Missouri Attorney General, Jeremiah “J” Nixon, Special Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln CountyMissouri at the Supreme Court Building, Jefferson CityMissouri on this 9th day of April, 1999.

 

     This document was never recognized by Judge Glenn Norton or the Special Prosecutor and was totally ignored as though it had no legal existence or meaning.

 

     On April 8, 1999, a “Notice of Defective Ruling (A Petition in nature of a Corum Nobis) was filed in the Circuit Court, Lincoln county, Missouri.

 

 

1.    Under a docket or “minute” entry, this court/judge stated, “Court overrules all

Seven matters noticed up in notices filed on March 3, 1999.

 

       

     2. The seven matters “noticed up” on that date are.

 

 

1.   Demand for appearance of special prosecuting attorney.

2.   Demand for preliminary hearing, ALTERNATE, Demand for Indictment

3.   Demand that Accuser be Identified (on individual “defendant” basis).

4.   A Plea in Bar (Former Jeopardy)

5.   Objection to “States” Motions and Hearings.

6.   Application for change of judge.

7.   Demand that Unauthorized Attorneys be Ejected.

 

 

     On a Lincoln County Circuit Court docket sheet on March 15, 1999, the following was recorded.  “The state reports that there were no motions pending”.  Judge Glenn Norton failed in his oath sworn duties by summarily overruling all seven matters, without giving the defendants their constitutional rights and due process of law, to discuss these matters.  Evidently Judge Norton didn’t want an open court discussion.  What did he have to hide?  Could it have been that he didn’t want it on the record so that he didn’t want to put himself in jeopardy?

 

3.   The defendants, by way of a “NOTICE TO THE COURT”, file stamped and dated 19 March, 1999, withdrew such matters from consideration because the Special Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln CountyMissouri, again, had not appeared.  Judge Norton did nothing to stop this fraudulent “show trial”.  He was part of the problem, not the solution.

 

     On April 8, 1999, a “Notice of Non-Jurisdiction” was filed in the Lincoln County Circuit Court.

 

        Part one – It has come to the attention of these defendants that the “so called judge”, Glenn Norton, has not been lawfully appointed to hear this case.  The record shows that a document from the Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc, dated 5 November, 1998, To Wit:

 

        The following judicial personnel:

 

        The honorable Glenn A. Norton (33222), Associate Circuit Judge of the 19th Judicial Circuit (Ralls County), be transferred to the following court or district, the 45th Judicial Circuit (Lincoln County).

 

        In the matter of:

 

        State of Missouri vs. Andrew Cella etal, case #CR196-530FX

 

     It is further ordered that the judge, hereby transferred, shall have the same powers and responsibilities as a judge of the court or district to which transferred.  Such powers and responsibilities shall be confined to designated matters and cases, and shall continue until final disposition of such designated matters, including after trial proceedings.  At the discretion of the judge the record may be made by the utilization of electronic recording.

 

 

 

 

 

                              

Unsigned

 

 

 

                              

                              

DUANE BENTON, CHIEF JUSTICE

             

 

     This document was signed by Thomas Simon, Clerk, and Kathy K. Fletchell, Deputy Clerk.

 

     In a Missouri court case SLAY v. SLAY 965 SW 2d at 845 which stated:

 

        Article 5, Section 1 of the state constitution vests the judicial power of this state, in this court, the court of appeals and the circuit courts.  These courts are composed of judges.  Missouri Constitution, Article V, Sections 2, 13, 15 and 16.  Although the documents filed in these cases are denominated “Judgment”, THEY ARE NOT SIGNED BY A JUDGE

 

     Because the documents are not signed by a person selected for office in accordance with and authorized to exercise judicial power by Article V of the state Constitution, no final appealable judgment has been entered, and this court is without jurisdiction.  It  is interesting to note however, that the SLAY decision itself was signed by a clerk, not by a judge.  This is typical of the sloppy, and unprofessional actions that take place, not only in Missouri, but throughout the entire united States.  The powers that be, hold the citizens accountable to the “Law”, while the law itself does not live up to the law.  This “double standard” is a fraud on its face.  (The time is long past for all public officials, in every capacity, to be held accountable for their actions and deeds).

 

     The Missouri Supreme Court order appointing Judge Glenn Norton is fraudulent, not only because a judge did not sign the document, but that Judge Norton was appointed to adjudicate case number CR196-530FX – State vs. Andrew Cella etal, when in fact this case number did not legally exist because the case number was assigned by Judge Rush, after Judge Rush had lost his jurisdiction in this matter.  So everything that Judge Rush did after he had legally lost his jurisdiction, is null and void.  This was confirmed by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, in a decision handed down on July 7, 1998, when the first trial was reversed and remanded.

 

        This is a typical example of how the courts, prosecutors, lawyers and law enforcement officials, usurp their authority, violate citizens rights and trample on them like they are non-entities and of no consequence.  Our society today, seems to operate on a double standard theme.  One standard for the haves and another standard for the have-nots

 

THEREFORE; The alleged Judge, Glenn Norton, had no jurisdiction in this case, and again, at the time of his presence on the bench, of this trial, never had filed or recorded his Oath of Affirmation, as prescribed by law.

 

        On April 8, 1999, a “Disqualification of Judge for Cause” was filed in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, Missouri.

 

1.   Despite numerous prior pleadings from these defendants, which were more than adequate in informing the court.  The Special Prosecuting Attorney in this case, has as yet, not made an appearance

2.   This court has neglected, failed and refused to comport itself in accord with an express statutory command within RSMo. 56.090

3.   These defendantsG comprehend the above neglect, failure or refusal, as being not mere avoidance or evasion, but is of a more atrocious dimension, namely, that a willful and deliberate lawless corruption existed on the part of the unauthorized lawyers and acceded to by this court and judge.  Shame on you and shame on all of us.

4.   Thus court knows full well that the lawyers acting to prosecute, are not authorized and are not the legal prosecuting attorney’s

5.   This court knows full well that the unlawfully designated special prosecuting attorney, Jeremiah “J” Nixon, has never appeared or even attempted to prosecute any part of the prior or present, color of law proceedings, in these cases.

6.   Despite the above stated facts, Judge Norton did overrule and deny previously filed and noticed-up pleadings from and by these defendants, without any hearing on such matters and without the proper judge or proper states advocate present.

7.   These defendants comprehend such actions by Judge Glenn Norton, as being clear and conclusive evidence that the court/judge in not independent or impartial, but is in fact, an active co-collaborator in concert with the usurping and unauthorized states prosecutors, who have acted under color-of-law to prosecute these cases, against these defendants.

 

        WHEREFORE:

This court is duty bound to notify the Missouri Supreme Court to appoint a disinterested special judge to convene and hear a cause against this present judge in regard to a disqualification for cause.

 

       This document was filed and served on all parties and hand delivered to the receptionist of Missouri Attorney General, Jeremiah “J” Nixon’s office in the Missouri Supreme Court BuildingJefferson CityMissouri.  This document, again, was ignored.

 

       On April 8, 1999, a “Petition/Motion to Sever:  was filed in the Lincoln County Circuit Court.

 

1.   The unauthorized lawyers purportedly acting on behalf of the state in these cases have entered/filed a “motion to consolidate”, such motion being sustained on 22 of February, 1000, without the states special prosecuting attorney being present.

2a The consolidation above said, presents a problem in the area of the right to counsel:

  b. Under the ruling of FARETTA v. CALIFORNIA, a criminal case defendant has a right to refuse counsel, even if a state seeks to compel counsel upon an unwilling defendant.  In the language of the Supreme Court of the united States, a defendant has a right to make a fool of himself.

 

 3. Because of the above said “consolidation”, these defendants are confronted (again) with a prospect of unwanted and effectively intermeddling lawyers, who have been appointed counsel for some co-defendants, who have interfered (perhaps unwittingly) with aspects of defense strategy of these defendants.

4.   Given the premises (above at points #2(a) and #2(b), wherein there is a right to have counsel, and the opposite, not to have counsel, these defendants assert a  RIGHT, NOT to be compelled into a consolidated joint trial, wherein some of the defendants are represented by so called “licensed” lawyers, while the remaining defendants are not so represented.  These defendants contend that such a “mixed” representation and joint trial, violated as announced in FARRETTA by way of an indirection.

 

WHEREFORE: These defendants, who are without counsel, demand a “severed and separate trial from the defendants, who are represented by counsel.

 

  This document was also filed and served on all parties by hand delivery to the receptionist of Missouri Attorney General, Jeremiah “J” Nixon, in the Missouri Supreme Court BuildingJefferson CityMissouri.  This again, was denied and ignored.

 

  We would like to mention at this time that all of the defendants, who were represented by the states public defenders, were, in our estimation, sold down the river, by these public defenders.  It has been quite evident that the sole purpose of the public defenders, with a few exceptions, is to plea bargain, so as to not drag out court proceedings.  We also believe that is why the Lincoln County Circuit Court and the states prosecutors were so vehement against those defendants that had not secured counsel, because the court proceedings were being dragged out far longer than the court and state had originally estimated.  The court and the states prosecutors thought that they could rough shod over these defendants and sweep us under the rug in short order.  But we didn’t cave in and roll over, and that is why we were severely punished, insulted, ridiculed and demeaned, in front of the jury, and treated in a manner, much more abusive than those individuals that had committed treason against our country, by consorting and selling highly classified military and defense secrets to our enemies.  We were fighting to save our good and honorable names, and would not admit to any wrongdoing, when we knew that we hadn’t committed any crimes.  We refused to sell our honor at any price.  In other words, we would not bow to tyranny.

 

   On April 8, 1999, a “Petition/Motion to Dismiss” (Failure to prosecute), was filed in the Lincoln County Circuit Court.

 

    This Petition/Motion is almost identical as the document “Disqualification of Judge for Cause”.  As of May 3, 1999, nearly three years have elapsed since the initial complaint, without any appearance of the Special Prosecutor.  This was also delivered to the appropriate parties.  Again, no response.

 

     Also on April 8, 1999, a “Plea in Bar” (Statute of Limitations) was filed in the Lincoln County Circuit Court.

 

     Now before the court for special appearance only, to invoke secured Rights under the Constitution of the united States of America 1787-1789, Treaty of the Bill of
Rights, 1789-1791, and the Missouri Constitution, the alleged defendants do state:

         

1.   Under the Missouri Criminal Code, Section 556.036, prosecution for offenses, less than a Class “A” felony, must be commenced within three years.

 

2.   The so called complaint was filed on June 17, 1996, which alleges that the commission of the offense, having occurred on or about 1 April, l996.

 

3.   There has not been a lawful, Information or Indictment produced or filed into the record in this case.

 

4.   Therefore, no prosecution has been commenced as defined at Section 556.036 (5) and THEREFORE; The time of limitation having run out and lapsed, the prosecution is barred because of the following, which was filed with the “Plea in Bar” (Statute of Limitations), was a Memorandum Brief in Support of the “Plea in Bar (Statute of Limitations).

 

 

     Introductory – The Plea in Bar represents the question of whether a criminal prosecution in this case was commenced timely.  These alleged defendants assert and present the OUT-OF-TIME position as follows.

 

1.   The codification in 1994 RSMo., Section 556.036, states that offenses less than a Class “A” Felony, must be “commenced” within three years.

 

2.   The “exceptions” indicated in RSMo., Section 556.036 (5), as when an indictment is found, or when an information is filed.

 

3.   “Commenced” is defined at RSMo., Section 556.036 (5), as when an Indictment is found, or when an Information is filed.

 

4.   The instant when the time clock is started is hinted (point #1 above) and is defined at Section 556.036 (4) as “Time starts to run on the day after the offense is committed”.

 

5.   The offense, as asserted by the state is specified in the so called “Complaint”, as having occurred on or about 1 April, 1996.

 

6.   These alleged defendants assert and contend that NO INDICTMENT and NO INFORMATION has been “found” or “filed” in this case for the following reasons.

 

7.   It is an unquestionable fact that no indictment has ever been produced or presented in regard to this case.

 

8.   It is also a fact, that NO LAWFUL Information has ever been “filed” in regard to this case, because.

 

9.   It is Constitutionally mandated in Criminal proceedings that an indictment or an information be filed; the existence of a formal and valid charging instrument is jurisdictional.

 

Mandatory that information be filed.

 

STATE v. HANDLEY (m0) (1979) 585 SW 2d 458

STATE v. CHAMBERS (KC 1977) 550 SW 2d 846

CITY OF FLORISSANT v. ROUILLARD (Ed 1974) 510 SW 2d 185

MONTGOMERY v STATE (Mo 1970) 454 SW 2d 571

STATE v ALLISON 9KC 1968) 424 SW 2d 754

STATE v. MCQUEEN (Mo 1955) 282 SW 2d 539

STATE v. HAMPTON (Mo 1943) 172 SW 2d 1

STATE v. PARRETT (Mo 1931) 44 SW 2d 76

 

10. Decisions have held that Constitutional authority to file informations is derived from common law and is limited to the Attorney General (or Solicitor General) or, as adopted to the American systems of the various counties.

 

11. AUTHORITY to file common law Information:

Information can be presented by an Attorney General, or a Solicitor General, or a Prosecuting Attorney, of a county.

 

 

EX PARTE SLATER, 72 Mo. 102 (1880)

STATE v. HELM, 79 Mo. 515 (1883)

STATE v. RUSSELL, 88 Mo. 648 (1886)

STATE v. KYLE, 166 Mo. 287 (1901)

STATE v. COLEMAN, 186 Mo. 151 (1905) {dissent p. 169}

 

 

12. Although diluted somewhat in more recent years, it is still constitutionally mandatory that Information be signed by a correct or by the proper public prosecuting officer.  MANDATORY Information be signed by correct proper prosecuting attorney:

 

 

STATE v. MIMS (Ed 1982) 637 SW 2d 390

STATE EX REL. WESTFALL v. CLIFFORD (Ed 1981) 617 SW 2d 102

STATE v. TIERNEY (WD 1979) 584 SW 2d 618

STATE EX REL.MARTIN v. BERRY (KC 1977) 560 SW 2d 54

CITY OF FLORISSANT v. ROUILLARD (Ed 1974) 510 SW 2d 185

STATE v ELGIN (Mo 1965) 391 SW 2d 341

KANSAS CITY v. ASBY (KC 1964) 377 SW 2d 511

 

CONTRA SEE:

 

WALSTER v. STATE (Mo 1969) 438 SW 2d 1

STATE v VAN SICKEL (WD 1984) 675 SW 2d 907

STATE v. SINCUP (ED 1984) 674 SW 2d 689

STATE v. SAUNDERS (ED 1985) 703 SW 2d 909

STATE v. KNIGHT (ED 1988) 764 SW 2d 656

 

 

13. Because a private citizen is not a public prosecuting officer, any paper or document which purports to be an Information, but is signed only by a private citizen and presented to a court or judicial officer or clerk as an Information is totally void, ab initio.

 

EX PARTE THOMAS, 10 Mo. App. 24 (1881)

STATE v. BRISCOE, 80 Mo. 643 (1883)

STATE v. KELM, 79 Mo. 515 (1883)

STATE v. SHORTELL, 93 Mo. 123 (1887)

STATE v. HARRINGTON, (Mo, Banc, 1976) 534 SW 2d 44

 

14. The absence of a signature of the correct and proper prosecuting officer, yields the legal result of no charges before the court and no Jurisdiction.

 

Unsigned, “Information precluded the filing of a valid charge”.

 

Absence of Prosecutors signature=No charge filed:

STATE v. WHITE (1968) 429 SW 2d 277

KANSAS CITY v. ASBY (1964) 377 SW 2d 511

 

15. As applied in this case instance, the illegally appointed “Special Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln CountyMissouri”, Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon, has never appeared in this case.  The document(s) which purport to be Information(s), were not signed by that appointed “Special Prosecuting Attorney”.  By so doing, that imposter may have committed criminal offenses, such as “false impersonation”, (RSMo. Section 575.120) or Perjury (RSMo. Section 575.040).

           

16. Because the “Information” was not signed by a lawfully correct and proper public prosecuting officer, the document was false and fraudulent, which did not, do not and cannot invest a trial court with jurisdiction, and for that reason, any further efforts toward a continuation of proceedings in the case of MISSOURI v. ANDREW CELLA etal., are void.

 

The foregoing was served on all parties and was hand delivered to the receptionist of Missouri Attorney General, Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon, the alleged “Special Prosecuting Attorney” for Lincoln CountyMissouri in the Supreme Court Building, Jefferson CityMissouri on April 9, 1999.

 

Again, no response or recognition, from either the Court, or Attorney Generals Office. . 

 

            On  April 8, 1999, a “Petition/Motion to Dismiss” (Unconstitutional procedure) was filed in the Lincoln County Circuit Court.

 

1.   Within the scope of decisional law in Missouri, it has been held that the Constitution of Missouri contemplates and authorizes only a common law information or an indictment.

2.   It is further held that the legislature is without power or authority to authorize any other than an Information as known as the common law.

3.   At the common law, an information, was not allowed/authorized, for felonies.

4.   By statute, the Missouri legislature sought to authorize an information as a procedural and charging device.  Such statute is unconstitutional.

 

 

           WHEREFORE:  The proceedings here are unconstitutional and must be dismissed.

 

                This document was file stamped and delivered to the appropriate parties.

                 Again, no response or consideration, was given , to this matter.  The lack of responses in these matters, brings the defendants to the conclusion that the court and the Attorney General of Missouri knew that the defendants were correct in their law, and therefore could not reply properly, without admitting that the court and the Attorney General, were fraudulent, and had committed irreparable harm and Judicial and Prosecutorial misconduct, in their official capacity and duties.

 

        On April 8, 1999, a “Petition/Motion to Dismiss (unconstitutional procedure) {Principals vs. Accessories} was filed in the Lincoln County Circuit Court.

 

1.   The concept of Principals and Accessories is originated in the older common law notions, which pre-dated the more modern system of written form of constitutional law.

2.   Despite the newer form of constitutional law, the idea of Principals and Accessories persisted as a not yet discredited vestige.

3.   In Missouri that vestige still exists somewhat slowly, because it seems as though it has been taken to task by any direct challenge.

4.   These defendants choose to challenge that mode of procedure, and to assert and to contend, that this is unconstitutional.

5.   By way of a statutory change, the older method of procedure, whereby an “accessory” might be charged, and proceeded against, in the same mode or manner as a “principal”, was repealed.

6.   Because of that repeal, and after the fact thereof, these defendants assert and contend, that they cannot be “charged” as being “principals”, and then be tried or convicted as “accessories”. And that such a mode of procedure is unconstitutional

 

 WHEREFORE: These cases, must be dismissed.

 

       The above and foregoing were served on all parties and hand delivered to the receptionist of Attorney General Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon’s office in the Missouri Supreme Court Building, Jefferson City, Missouri, on April 9, 1999

 

       No response was tendered by either the court or the Attorney General.

 

 On April 18, 1999, a “Petition/Motion to Dismiss,” (unconstitutional statute Part-one), (Log Roller Bill).

 

1.   These alleged defendants contend that RSMo., Section 565.084 is unconstitutional and not enforceable, for the reason that unconstitutionality, as more fully set out and explained in the attached memorandum brief, hereto attached and made part hereof by reference.

 

            WHEREFORE; These cases, must be dismissed.

 

             The following is a brief outline of the MEMORANDUM BRIEF “Log Rolling”

1.   The appeal alleges three grounds of unconstitutionality of the statute RSMo. 565.084.  The first ground is, namely, that the statute which first enacted Section 565.084 is unconstitutional, because the statute contains more than one subject, which is in violation of the prohibition, at Article III, Section 23 of the Missouri constitution, which reads;

 

Section 23.  LIMITATION OF SCOPE OF BILLS-CONTENTS OF TITLES-EXCEPTION- “No bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except bills enacted under the third exception in Section 37 of this article and general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subject and accounts, for which moneys are appropriated”. (Emphasis added)

2.   The various constitutions of this state have contained a similar limitation beginning with the constitution of 1865, which stated at Article IV, Section  XXXII, “No law enacted by the General Assembly, shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof, as is not so expressed”, and was stated in the constitution of 1875, at Article IV.

 

Section XXVIII.  No bill (except general appropriations bills), which may embrace the various subjects and accounts, for and on account, of which moneys are appropriated, and except bills passed under the third subdivision of Section forty-four of this article), shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title”.

 

3.   The objective of this provision was discussed early on in the case of CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. TIEFEL (1868) 42 Mo. 578 at 589.

 

“The constitutional clause is now with us, though it has been adopted in many of our sister states.  It was intended to prevent surprise of fraud upon the members of the legislature by means often resorted to in the provisions of bills, of inserting matters of which the title has no limitations, and also to effectively stop the vicious and corruptive system known as “Log Rolling”.

                        

 

 

The practice of comprising one bill, subjects of a diverse and antagonistic nature, in order to combine in its support, members who were in favor of particular measures, but neither of which measures could command the requisite majority on its own merits, was found to be not only a corrupting influence in the legislature itself, but destructive of the best interest of the state.

 

Since the adoption of the Constitution of (1865), there has been but one case of the STATE v. LAYFETTE COUNTY, 41 Mo. 39.

 

                 

 

Only two years later, the same principals and purpose was again stated in STATE OF MISSOURI v. MILLER (1870) 45 Mo. 495 at 498.  The principle is a correct one, and the intention was good, it was designated to strike down a most vicious and corrupt system which prevailed in our legislative bodies, and which operated as a surprise, and was productive of fraud and plunder.  It was intended to kill “Log rollering” and prevent unscrupulous, designing men and interested parties from dexterously inserting matters in the body of a bill, of which the title gave no intimation of the true character or of comprising subjects, diverse and antagonistic in their nature, but who could not carry their object without an agreement to go for some other measure, when neither, on its own merits, could command the requisite majority.

                   

What constitutes a proper and “acceptable” title, etc., has been discussed in many different cases, each applying to the particular case at hand.  In the case of STATE EX REL. ATTORNEY GENERAL v. MILLER (1890) 100 Mo. 439 at 445.

 

In EWING v. HOLITZELLE, 85 Mo. 64, the following rule was taken from Sedwick, was approved:  Where all of the provisions of a statute fairly relate to the same subject, have a natural connection with it, are the incidents or means of accomplishing it, then the subject is single, and it is sufficiently expressed in the title, the statute is valid.  Substantially the rule has been laid down in several previous cases.  The CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. TIEFEL, 42 Mo. 578; STATE v. MATTHEWS, 44 Mo. 523; STATE v. MILLER, 45 Mo. 495; The CITY OF HANNIBAL v. THE COUNTY OF MARION, 69 Mo. 571; STATE EX REL. v. MEAD, 71 Mo. 268.  {The reference to “Sedwick” is Sedwick on Constitutional and state law.

 

     The beginnings of a “foundation” to test the validity of statutes in relation to the constitutional provision of “only one subject in each bill”, is indicated in the case of STATE EX REL HARRIS v. LAUGHLIN (1882) 75 Mo. 358 at 369.

 

     In the case of STATE v. BURGDOERFER (1891) 107 Mo. 1, 19, some rather specific guidelines were announced.

 

     “The constitutional provision under review has two distinct aspects in its relation to the power of the court to nullify an act for non-conformity to it.  First, if the title of an act clearly fails to contain the subject, or the act clearly contains two incongruous subjects, whether expressed in the title or not, the act is void per se, without regard to whether legislators or people were mislead or not.  In such case, the only question for the court to determine is, does the title clearly fail to contain the subject, or does the act contain two or more incongruous subjects?

 

     If the court can answer this question in the affirmative, the act will be declared unconstitutional, if in the negative, it will be held valid.  Here the courts can find some solid ground on which to stand.  The main object of this inhibition was to require the title to contain the subject of the act and to prevent the insertion in the same bill of two or more incongruous subjects, not because legislators and people might be mislead, but to prevent log-rolling and cross-lifting by which different interests might combine and succeed in enacting an omnibus statute that could never be passed., if each subject had to stand or fall on its own merits or demerits.

 

     The principle finds many illustrations in the adjudged cases of this and other states.  STATE EX REL. v. COUNTY COURT, supra (102 Mo, 531) (cool con. Lim. 170, et seq., and cases cited in notes.

 

     Specifically, the statute involved here is identified as “C.C.S.H.C.S.S.C.S.S.B. #215 and 58, as published in the 1989, Laws of Missouri, at page 636 {Pages 597,598,599 and 636 to 641, are appended to this brief.}

 

     The title to the act simply states, “Public Health and Welfare: Crimes and Punishment”.  The enacting clause states, “An Act to repeal sections——and sections——–relating to crimes and punishment, and to enact in lieu thereof.  Seventy four new sections relating to the same subject, with penalty provisions, and an effective date for certain actions”.

 

     The title does not state that it is an act to amend an act; in other words, to amend a statute per se, as in the sense distinct from that of amending a codification of statutes.

 

     The title does not state that it is an act to revise (certain designated sections) of the Revised Statutes of Missouri.  Rather the Bill (and Act) directly announces the repeal of a number of sections, as expressly cited, of previous enactment, and hen purports to enact  seventy-four new sections relating, so it is asserted, to the same subject as the repealed sections.

 

     This Bill (and Act) does not limit itself as to amend, or to revise the contents of any one particular statute (per se); nor does it limit itself as to amend, or to revise only the particular sections as cited in the preamble, and to substitute in lieu thereof, new sections which closely relate to the subject matter of the repealed sections.

 

     This Bill (and Act) is not in fact limited to changes relating solely to “crimes and punishment” for the reason that it contains new enactments within RSMo., Chapter 631, concerning drug and alcohol abuse programs, under the Department of Mental Health (p. 637) and it also contains various provisions relating to sales taxes (Section #1 through #6, p. 638 to 641).

 

      THEREFORE;  Be it declared by this court, that the statute is unconstitutional.

 

       The above and foregoing was served on all parties and by hand delivery to the receptionist of the Missouri Attorney General, Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon’s office, in the Missouri Supreme Court Building, Jefferson CityMissouri on 9 April, 1999.

 

     On May 3, 1999, a “Petition/Motion to Dismiss and Petition/Motion to Suppress, and Petition/Motion in Limine (Collateral Estoppel) was filed in the Lincoln County Circuit Court.

 

      Now before the court for special appearance only, to invoke secured Rights under the Constitution of the united States of America, 1787-1789, Treaty of the Bill of Rights, 1789-1791 and the Missouri Constitution, the defendants do state:                        

 

1.   The charge by Information among other things alleges that a “Lien” was filed, meaning recorded.

2.   These defendants counter-allege that the state is collaterally estopped from alleging that a lien was filed because:

 

a.    On April 12, 1996, a petition for a Writ of Mandamus was filed at the Lincoln County Circuit Court under the title of STATE EX REL FLYNN v. HOUSTON, CU 196-332CC, and requested that the recording be ordered null and void (count 1) and that the documents be declared void (count 2).

b.    In the (first) “Suggestions in Support of Petition for Writ of Mandamus”, filed with the petition on April 12, 1996, the state alleges/argues that the documents which were said to be a “judgment Lien”, are defective on their face.

c.    In the “Realtors Additional Suggestions in Support of Issuance of an Absolute Writ of Mandamus”, filed on May 1, 1996 and after the Respondents answer to the petition, the state alleges/argues that the documents were fatally deficient on their face.

d.    The Respondents “Answer to the Petition” presented a good faith dispute as to the authority to record such documents, and as to the validity of the documents.

e.    On May 9, 1996, the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, Missouri ordered that the documents be removed (expunged) from the public records of Lincoln County.  Implicit in that order, the Circuit Court ruled that the documents themselves are void because it was not “proved or acknowledged according to law”, and were not “authorized by law”, to be recorded.

 

3.   The documents were specifically identified in the (expungement) order, Thusly:

 

The documents were recorded, by the Recorder.  The documents filed and recorded were:

 

1.    A notice dated March 30, 1996, signed by Melvin Lenk (for the benefit of) Amanda Brooke Lenk, directed to Patrick S. Flynn and was recorded in Book 880 at page 301.

2.    A security – 15 U.S.C., that was recorded in book 880 at pages 302-303

3.    Affidavit of Information Criminal Complaint filed in Book 880 at pages 304-316

4.    An Affidavit of Claim of Lien and a Affidavit of Obligation recorded in Book 880 at pages 317-324

5.    A result from the above said order in that the documents which were said to be a lien, have been duly ruled as null and void, and are not a lien as a matter of law.  The decision is res Judicata and is conclusive against the state.

 

          THEREFORE; Because the documents said to be a lien, are not a lien in fact or law, the state is collaterally estopped from asserting or alleging that a lien was filed and:

 

          THEREFORE:  The Complaint filed on 17 June, 1996, and the Information filed on 23 August, 1996, must be dismissed because of the now exposed fraud on the face, thereof committed by the state, and:

 

          THEREFORE:  The above said and identified documents, which have also been identified  by the state as “States Exhibits #3, must be suppressed from use by the state because the state is collaterally estopped from now asserting or exhibiting such documents in support of a claim which is res Judicata to the contrary.  To allow the state to use of such documents as evidence, is to authorize a compounding of a fraud and:

 

          THEREFORE:  The state should order in Limine, so as to preclude the state from referring to any documents as being a lien, as well as offering any such documents to be introduced into evidence.  Under the res Judicata and collateral estoppel, the documents are not admissible.

 

        This Petition/Motion, was ignored by Judge Glenn Norton, and the states prosecutors.  The states prosecutors hammered this fraudulent information to the jury unrelentingly, so as to misdirect the jury’s final decision in favor of the state and against the defendants.  This was a blatant misuse of power and authority to their sworn Oath of Affirmation.  This action showed the collusion between the court and the prosecution.

 

        On May 17, 1999, a “Discovery-Defense witness’s, Subpoenas Served” notice was filed in the Lincoln County Circuit Court.  There were many subpoenas, which arfe too numerous t enumerate.

 

1.   There were four (4) expert witness’ subpoenaed

2.   There were seventy four (74) defense witness,’ subpoenaed.

 

       Comes now the alleged defendants and give notice to the Missouri Attorney General, Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon, Special Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln County, Missouri, that the defendants intend to call the above witness’ under the Constitution of the united States of America, 1787-1789, the Bill of Rights, 1789-1791, and the Missouri Constitution, with NO JURISDICTION, given to any PRIVATE, COPYRIGHT LAWS OF CORPORATE, ADMINISTRATIVE, ADMIRALTY, TRIBUNAL, OR JURY TRIAL COURTS.

 

        The above and foregoing “Discovery-DEFENSE WITNESS’, was served on all parties by United States Postal (postage prepaid) to Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon, the Special Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln County, Missouri, in the Missouri Supreme Court Building, Jefferson City, Missouri on the 7th day of May, 1999.

 

        On May 19, 1999, the state of Missouri sent to the court, the defendants, and to the attorneys that were representing several of the defendants, the following document entities.

 

          “STATE TRIAL BRIEF ON THE ISSUE OF ADMISABILITY OR RELEVANCE  OF OTHER GRAND JURORS HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH ANY CRIMES.”

 

          “The trial court should not allow any of the defendants or their ATTORNEYS TO PUT BEFORE THE JURY ANY EVIDENCE AS TO THE FACT THAT OTHER FREEMAN GRAND JURORS HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH ANY CRIME WHEN THIS EVIDENCE IS COMPLETELY IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUES WHICH THE JURY IS CALLED UPON TO DECIDE.”

 

        In the above statement, when Mr. Nixon referred to the word “FREEMAN”, Mr. Nixon again was trying to implant into the minds of the jurors and other interested parties, that the defendants were connected to the “Montana Freeman”, which, by any stretch of the imagination, doesn’t have the slightest semblance of truth to it.  There were times, in this debacle, that the defendants did refer, to ourselve’s, as FREE MEN, not “FREEMEN”, which is a big difference.  This is another attempt by the prosecution to stigmatize these defendants as being “FREEMEN”, anti-government, revolutionaries, and kooks.  Also to deny these defendants the right to exercise their God given constitutional right to subpoena witness’ in their defense, in order to bring out the facts that would help the defendants, and to help the jury to render a more intelligent verdict.  What was the state afraid of, because the subpoenas listed judges, the Missouri Attorney General, the states three prosecutors, lawyers, bankers, a Missouri state representative, a Missouri state senator, staff officers of the Missouri Highway Patrol, two sheriffs and several deputy sheriffs, the Lincoln County Prosecuting Attorney and his assistant, the Lincoln County Circuit Clerk, the Lincoln County Recorder of Deeds and the Deputy Recorder of Deeds and others that were connected to this “dog and pony show trial” charade.

 

     How did the prosecutor or Judge Glenn Norton know what the defendants were going to ask the witness’?  What was the court, and the prosecution trying to hide?  Could it have been that the defendants were right, and by the evidence being brought out, that the court and the prosecution would have then been faced with criminal charges?

 

     On May 9, 1999, a “Motion to Quash Subpoenas” was filed in the Lincoln County Circuit Court of Judge Glenn Norton, by the state of Missouri.  To Wit:

 

        In a paragraph, of the above, mentioned motion, it states.

 

        “The testimony of these witness’” would not be material to the issue at hand.  None of these witness’ have any first hand knowledge, of any of the facts, required to be established, by the state in this opposition.  It would be unreasonable and oppressive to force witness’, who have no relevant evidence respecting this case to be compelled to travel and attend this trial, essentially waiting to not to be allowed to testify.

.

 

     WHEREFORE:  The state of Missouri respectfully requests this court to issue an Order Quashing the Subpoenas issued to all witness’.

 

     NOTE:  When the state referred to the subpoenaed witness’ as having no first hand knowledge, again, how did they know what they were going to be asked?  Also, the prosecution subpoenaed witness’ against these defendants that had no first hand knowledge, but the court allowed the states witness’ to testify.  Would you call this a double standard?  We don’t believe that a person would have to stretch their imagination to far to recognize this blatant usurpation of power and authority.  The defense witness’, in their official capacities and great range of knowledge, would have certainly been able to shed a great light in the defense of the defendants, but again, the prosecution cut the defendants off at the pass at every opportunity to cover up the truth.  The information that the defendants were seeking would have been brought out under questioning.  Another side of the coin is that maybe the intended witness’ brought pressure on the court and the prosecution, because they felt that they were above the law, and due to their powerful positions, should not be compelled to testify.  Which ever side of the coin you are looking at, the defendants rights to Due Process of Law, were violated.

 

     On May 24, 1999, a “Petition in Opposition To Quash Subpoenas”, was filed by the defendants in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, Missouri.

 

     Now before the court for Special Appearance only, these defendants invoke secured rights under the Constitution of the united States of America, 1787-1789, the Bill of Rights, 1789-1791, and the Missouri Constitution, without giving jurisdiction to any court except under the above Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

 

1.      These alleged defendants again renew the continuing objection to the unauthorized presence of the lawyers, and the imposter prosecutors in this case and to their continued practice of filing motions etc., in this matter.  The lawyer’s, imposters have total disrespect for the Constitution of the united States, 1787-1789, along with disrespect for the Bill of Rights, 1789-1791, and the Missouri Constitution, and if the law is repugnant to the Constitutions (Marbury vs. Madison, 5 US (2 cranch) 137, 174, 176 (1803), then the law is not the law.

 

2.      Pursuant to the Constitutional provisions of the Constitution of the united States of America 1787-1789, the Bill of Rights, 1789-1791, and the Missouri Constitution, the alleged defendants have a right to defend.  The state’s motion is a broad brush effort to muzzle these alleged defendants and for that reason alone, the motion should be struck

 

3.      An order sustaining the state’s motion, would act to deny Constitutional rights by reducing and limiting the alleged defendants ability to speak upon matters of defense with their witness’, and thereby precluding an effective defense and deny due process.

 

   

Billl of Rights, Congress of the united States as written on Wednesday the Fourth of March, 1789, ratified 1791…..

 

1.   Article the Third – Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or the press; or the right of the people, peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. (Known today as the First Amendment).

2.   Article the Eighth   –  In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witness’ against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witness’ in his favor….(Known today as the Sixth Amendment)

3.   Constitution of Missouri, not the state of Missouri; Constitution, Article I, Section 18(a)….”Right of the accused in criminal prosecutions”…That in criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend, in person or by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation, to meet the witness’ against him, face to face, and to have process to compel the attendance of witness’ in his behalf, and a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the county”.  (Soiurce: Constitution of 1875, Article II, Section 22).

4.   Missouri Court Rules 25.03 and 25.04 pertains to the states disclosures.

5.   In defense, the alleged defendants, under the Constitution states that; Bill of Rights, Article the Eighth….”to have compulsory process for obtaining witness’ in his behalf”, to deny this right, is unconstitutional, this alone, should deny the state the power to quash.

6.   All requirements for the witness’ to be subpoenaed have been complied with…to deny this RIGHT, is unconstitutional, and this alone, should be grounds to deny the state’s request to deny.

7.   In a previously filed “Subpoena Deuces Tecum”, which was filed to subpoena Phillip G. Smith {The peoples Representative, District No. 11 of the Missouri House of Representatives}, as a witness, and to produce the following legal papers, documents and records, under subpoenaed defense witness, Phillip G. Smith’s control, for the June 6, 1999 trial in alleged case No. Cr196-429 a/h/a CR 196-530FX

 

1.    Any legal papers, documents, and records under his control, other than documents obtained by fraud, without full disclosure, that create the presumption that Andrew James, Cella, Floyd Lee, Heubner, Dennis Patrick, Logan, Michael Andrew, Peek, Roger Allen, Peek, James Tilden, Ransdell, Donald Ray, Schaeffer, Donald Lee, Shaffer, and Donald Lee, Young, are engaged in a taxable revenue and trafficking in commerce.  The “Subpoena Deuces Tecum”, asks for any documents and records under the subpoenaed witness’ control.  Being that Representative Phillip G. Smith of Louisiana, Missouri, represents part of the area where the alleged defendants abide Phillip G. Smith, being an elected Representative in the Missouri House of Representatives, should be able to answer the “Subpoena Deuces Tecum”, and bring the Constitution of Missouri to the court, at the proper time that his testimony is needed.

8.   The defendants do have the “compulsory process right for abtaining witness’ in his favor”, (Bill of Rights, Article 8th, 6th Amendment).  What better individual than Representative Smith, who represents part of the alleged defendants, and has the resources, to be of help in answering the questions of Discovery, whether they are Interrogatories or questions.

9.   There was no Missouri Constitutional information enclosed in the “Motion to Quash”, submitted by the imposters posing as the Missoui Attorney General prosecutors, supporting their motions.  There was no Constitutional information proffered by the prosecution to support their request as to why these subpoenas should be quashed.

10. The Constitution of the state of Missouri….”the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the facts”,…That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…”. “Justice without sale, denial or delay”….to have process to compel the attendance of witness’ in his behalf…” as well as the Constitution of the united States, 1787-1789, with the Bill of Rights, 1789-1791, states:…to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witness’ against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witness’ in his favor”…The cites mentioned by the imposter lawyers of the state, are not “Law” but “Color of Law”.

11. The fraudulent, unlawful and unconstitutional prosecutors, which were in attendance throughout these proceedings, had no right to determine who did or did not have first hand knowledge. In order to testify, a person can qualify because of knowledge, or their particular vocation, because in the first trial, the state used witness’ who had no first hand knowledge, but in that case the state deemed that it was alright to do this because it was potentially advantageous to their efforts.  Again, the designated Special Prosecutor in this case, Missouri Attorney General, Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon, was never legally or constitutionally appointed to this position, because only the governor can appoint a Special Prosecutor.  The three Assistant Attorney Generals, Theodore A. Bruce, Edward R. Ardini Jr., and David Hansen, in the firs trial and Theodore A. Bruce, Edward R. Ardini Jr., and Kevin Zoellner in the second trial, were illegally acting as prosecutors, because the Missouri Attorney General Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon, was the designated “Special Prosecutor” and not the Attorney Generals office.  It is stated in the Missouri law, that the “Special Prosecutor”, cannot designate his subordinates to prosecute.  Again Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon, has never made an appearance, at any time, or on any court date.

 

              WHEREFORE:  The above alleged defendants, under the Constitution of the united States of America, 1787-1789, the Bill of Rights, 1789-1791, and the Constitution of Missouri, request that said “Motion to Quash Subpoenas”, be denied.  

 

     A true, correct and complete copy of the “PETITION IN OPPOSITION TO QUASH SUBPOENAS”, WAS FORWARDED TO THE FOLLOWING ON THE 24TH OF May, 1999, through the United States Post Office mail, or hand delivered to the following.

 

     Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon

     Special Prosecuting Attorney of Lincoln CountyMissouri

     Supreme Court BuildingJefferson CityMissouri 65102

 

     Christine Sullivan, Public Defender

     300 N. 2nd, Suite 264

     St. CharlesMissouri 63301

 

     Shawn Goulet, Public Defender

     Saint Louis County Justice Center

     100 South Central, Second Floor

      ClaytonMissouri 633105

 

     Mark Evans, Public Defender

     250 B West College

     TroyMissouri 63379

 

     On May 24, 1999, a “Petition/Motion For Dismissal” was filed in the Lincoln County Circuit Court.

 

     Now before the court for special appearance only, these defendants invoke secured rights under the Constitution of the united States of America, 1787-1789, the Bill of Rights, 1789-1791, and the Missouri Constitution, without giving jurisdiction, take leave to be able to present this demand for the dismissal of the above cases for the following reasons.

 

1.   In the states “Motion to Quash Subpoenas”, and under the signature of Theodore A. Bruce, there is a statement that: (remember that there were four (4) expert witness’, and seventy four (74) defense witness’, that had been subpoenaed”).  The testimony of these witness’ would have been material to the issue at hand.  None of these witness’ have any first hand knowledge of the facts required to be established by the state, in this prosecution.

2.   The following is a partial list of those individual defendants witness’ as printed in the “Discovery Defense Witness’ -Subpoenas Served”, that Theodore A. Bruce believes that the defendants witness’, do not have first hand knowledge of any of the facts required to be established by the state in this prosecution:

 

The first seventeen (17) names belong to various ranks of the Missouri Highway Patrol. Then from Lincoln County comes Patrick S. Flynn, Associate Circuit Court Judge, G. John Richards, Prosecuting Attorney, James D. Burlison, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Melba Houston, Clerk of the Circuit Court and ex officio Recorder of Deeds, June Howard, Deputy County Recorder, Linda R. Hamlet, Associate Circuit Court Judge of Audrain County, Nancy Schneider, Associate Circuit Court Judge of St. Charles County, Melvin Eugene Lenk, Silex, Missouri, Amanda Brooke Lenk (Melvin’s daughter), Silex, Missouri, Pauline Buford, Deputy Clerk of the Circuit Court, St. Charles County, Ross W. Buchler, Deputy Clerk of the Circuit Court, St. Charles County.

 

     As stated by Theodore A. Bruce, the above named witness’ do not have first hand knowledge, then, their testimony and any information given to others by these states witness’, is inadmissible.  But in the first trial a lot of the above mentioned witness’ were called by the states prosecution.  Now all of a sudden, their testimony should be inadmissible.  This appears, not only to be self serving, but a double standard and fraud being perpetrated against the defendants, but was also accepted by Judge Glenn Norton, because Judge Norton, familiarized himself with the first trial, and he should have seen the very obvious manoeuvering by the states prosecutors.  Judge Glenn Norton should be charged under Title 42, Section 1986, knowledge of the law.

 

3.   If the state has no witness’ with first hand knowledge, there is no probable cause, supported by an Oath of Affirmation, then there is no lawfully written, signed and sworn complaint for LAWFUL WARRANTS to comply with the Fourth Amendment of the Bill of Rights, 1789-1791.

4.   If the state had no WITNESS’ with FIRST HAND KNOWLEDGE, there is no way to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation “or to be confronted with the witness’ against him, that no person (natural) shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.

 

 

SUMMARY:

 

A.           No first hand knowledge for the state of Missouri, for a crime that had allegedly been committed, as stated by he states prosecutor, Theodore A. Bruce, under his own signature.

B.            No way to inform the accused the nature and cause of accusation.

C.           No way to confront witness’ who had first hand knowledge of a crime that was alleged to have taken place.

D.           There were no witness’, that had first hand knowledge for a probble cause/

E.            There were no witness’ that had first hand knowledge, for affidavits for a complaint against the accused.

F.            There is no sworn complaint against the accused, by anyone with first hand knowledge.

G.           The Special Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln CountyMissouri, Attorney General Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon, has never made an appearance.

 

PRAYER:

 

THEREFORE:  Because of the above stated facts, this case must be DISMISSED.

    

     A true, correct and complete copy of the PETITION/MOTION FOR DISMISSAL” was forwarded to the following on May 24, 1999 through the United States Postal mail or hand delivered to the following.

 

     Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon

     Special Prosecuting Attorney of Lincoln County

     Supreme Court Building

     Jefferson CityMissouri 65102

 

     Christine Sullivan, Public Defender

     300 N. 2nd, Suite 264

     St. CharlesMissouri 63301

 

     Shawn Goulet, Public Defender

     Saint Louis County Justice Center

     100 South Central, Second Floor

     ClaytonMissouri 633105

 

     Mark Evans, Public Defender

     250B West College

     Troy Missouri 63379

 

     On May 27, 1999, Mr. Dennis Patrick Logan, one of the defendants received from the Supreme Court of Missouri, the following:

 

     State ex rel. Andrew J. Cella etal, Relators vs. Prohibitor.

 

     The Honorable Glenn Norton, Judge of the Circuit Court, Ralls CountyMissouri- Respondent.

 

     Now on this day, on consideration of the Petition for Writ of Prohibition to the said Respondent, it is ordered by the Court here that the said petition be, and the same is hereby denied.

 

     This document was not signed by a judge, but by a clerk and deputy clerk and therefore is null and void and unconstitutional, because of the following.

 

     “Generally, every state recognized the judgments of every other state, but Missouri judgments are void in other states because many lack a Judges Signature.  Some Missouri judgments are valid if they were signed by a family court commissioner between September of 1996 and April 1998.  In 1996, the Legislature passed a law allowing Commissioners to sign orders or judgments and the 1996 law was unconstitutional, SLAY v. SLAY 965 SW 2d at 85, which stated:

 

     Article V, Section 1 of the state Constitution vests the Judicial power of this state in this court, the Court of Appeals, and the Circuit Courts.  These courts are composed of judges.  Missouri Constitution, Article V. Sections 2, 13, 15 and 16.  Although the documents filed in these cases are denominated “Judgments”, they are not signed by a Judge.  Because the documents are not signed by a person selected for office in accordance with, and authorized to exercise judicial power by Article V of the state Constitution, no final appealable judgment has been entered, and this Court is without JURISDICTION.  It is interesting to note however, that the SLAY decision itself was signed by a clerk, not by a Judge.

 

     The signature requirements of Missouri Judgments are governed in part by the plain language of two rules, which state:

 

     Rule 74.01(a) included matters, “Judgment” as used in these rules include a degree and any order from which an appeal lies.  A judgment is rendered when entered.  A judgment is entered, when a writing, signed by a Judge and denominated “Judgment” is filed.  The judgment may be a separate document or included on the docket sheet of the case.

 

     Administrative Rule 4.09(6)…Orders or judgments entered on the docket(s) by the Judge or the Clerk, shall be signed by the Judge. Or supported by a memorandum in the file, signed by the Judge.

 

     In addition to the plain language of the rules, there are a number of cases that have upheld these rules.  As explained in MARTIN v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, State of Missouri, 10 SW 3d 618 (Mo. App E.D. 2/15/2000), citing the case of LOWERY v. AIR SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL INC., SW 2d 323, 324 (Mo App. SD 1998), a judgment is entered when.

 

1.   A writing

2.   Signed by a Judge

3.   Denominated “judgment”

4.   Is filed

 

     It is interesting to note however that the case of MARTIN v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, State of Missouri, was decided by the Southern District Court of Appeals, and even though the opinion stated that the requirement needs to be “signed by a judge”, the MARTIN case, was signed by the CLERK.  When Mr. Lee Martin asked for a copy of the Judgment, signed by a Judge, they refused, and told him that there was no copy signed by a Judge.  What that means is anybody’s guess.  I would argue, that the policies and procedures in Missouri Courts do not meet the minimum standards of the 14th Amendment right to due process of law.

 

     The case of LEONARD O. LARUE v. JANETTE LOHMAN case # 71802, establishes a bright line test on the validity or orders and judgments.  The bright line test is that the judgment or order must be IN WRITING and SIGNED by the JUDGE, it states:

 

     The Missouri Supreme Court recently explained in CITY OF ST. LOUIS V. HUGHES, 950 SW 2d 850 (Mo banc 1997), that rule 74.01(a) defines what constitutes a judgment.  The rule, which was amended in 1995, states, {a} judgment is entered when a writing, signed by a Judge, and denominated “judgment” is filed.  The judgment may be a separate document or included on the docket sheet of the case.  Rule 74.01(a) clarifies what constitutes a judgment by establishing a “bright line” test, HUGHES, at 6.  Thus, the written judgment must be signed by the Judge and must be designated a “judgment” although the designation “judgment” may appear at the top of the writing, within the body of the writing, or in the entry on the docket sheet Id.

 

     In KECK v. KECK, No 7502 (Mo App. ED 05/11/1999 it was ruled that document could not be retroactively converted, because the act of signing it establishes the date of the judgment.

 

     The 14th Amendment of the united States Constitution gives everyone his due process of law, which includes judgments that comply with the rules and case law.  Procedural due process, does that include the lack of a judges signature when the rules clearly requires a signature?  I would think so, and so would anyone else that believes in the law and the Constitution.  The argument may not fly in a Missouri Court, but any sane jurisdiction would have to uphold it.

 

     Although it would be a harder argument to make, I think if a good lawyer were to take the conduct of Missouri Courts as a whole, that an argument can be made that no Missouri judgment is valid.  In a state where the highest courts openly refuse t obey their own rules and abide by their own decisions, can any judgment, that comes from the government be relied upon to represent a judicial process?  What does it mean when the Missouri Supreme Court in SLAY v. SLAY rules that only Judges can sign judgments, yet the decision is signed by a CLERK?

 

   The defendants in this case have petitioned the Missouri Supreme Court for certain documents that were issued by the Missouri Supreme Court, to explain to these defendants, why certain documents failed to have a judges signature on them.  A good example of this is the document that transferred Associate Circuit Court Judge Glenn A. Norton, of the 10th Judicial Circuit (Ralls County) to the 45th Judicial Circuit (Lincoln County), in the matter of: STATE OF MISSOURI VS. ANDREW CELLA ETAL., case No. CR196-530FX.  This document was issued by the Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc, on November 5, 1998, but was not signed by a Judge.  Duane Benton, Chief Justice’s name appeared on the document, but was UNSIGNED.  The only signatures that appeared on this document were those of Thomas Simon, Clerk, and Kathy Fletchell, Deputy Clerk.  This document was void on its face.  But again the defendants were ignored as though we were a non-entity, and not important enough to be granted due process of law.

 

     A judgment obtained in procedural due process is not entitled to full faith and credit when sued upon in another jurisdiction.  NATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK V. WILEY, 195 U.S. 257, OLD WAYNE LIFE ASSN V. MCDONOUGH, 204 U.S. 8, 23; BAKER V. BAKER,ECCLES 7 CO., 242 U.S. 394, 401.  Moreover due process requires that no other jurisdiction shall give effect, even as a matter of comity, to a judgment elsewhere acquired without due process.

 

  The Missouri Supreme Court is not a judicial system, it’s a circus and a good example of this rationale is as follows:

 

     “Missouri law requires that the judgment be denominated  “judgment” or “Decree”, and that if the judgment lacks this denomination, it is not a valid judgment.  Here’s an example of an invalid Missouri judgment.  In this example, the judgment is hand written on the docket sheet.  That’s legal.  It also has the judges initials rather than the judges signature.  That too is legal.  However, it lacks the denomination of judgment or decree and is therefore void.  What judge made this void judgment you ask?  The judgment is the work of William Ray Price, the Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court.  This would be funny if it weren’t so tragic.  A Missouri Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court couldn’t write a judgment.  How pathetic.

 

     From the preamble to Supreme Court Rule 4, “The legal profession’s relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self government.  The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance or parochial of self interest concerns of the bar”.  It is very obvious and evident that Judges have forgotten that the courts exist for the sole purpose of serving the judicial needs of the people and for no other reason.  The time is long past for not only Judges, but for everyone that takes the Oath of Affirmation, to be held accountable for their actions and deeds.

 

     In the case of ELKINS ETAL. V. UNITED STATES, 364 U.S., 206, 80 SCT, 1437, 4 L Ed 2d, 1969, the united States Supreme Court, speaking about the imperative or judicial integrity stated:

 

     “In a government of laws”, said Mr. Justice Brandeis, “existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.  Crime is contagious.  If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law, it invites every man to become a law unto itself, it invites anarchy”.

 

     The fraudulent, unconstitutional trial started on JUNE 5, 1999, IN THE circuit Court of Lincoln CountyMissouri by the illegally and unconstitutionally appointed Judge Glenn A. Norton.  The state was represented also by the illegal and unconstitutionally appointed designated states prosecutors, Theodore A. Bruce, Edward R. Ardini Jr., and Kevin Zoellner.  There were fourteen (14) defendants present. The fifteenth original defendant was on probation and didn’t have to endure a second trial.  To keep from being too repetitive, the most important facts have already been brought forth in the preceding summary, starting on December 21, 1998, with the preliminary hearing.  The defendants again presented documentation that the defendants were in double jeopardy.  Again, the court completely ignored our plea.  When Judge Norton asked the defendants is we were “ready for trial”, the defendants answered “NO”, but again were ignored, as if we were of no consequence.  The trial was almost identical to the first.  We were denied counsel of our choice, not a state employed public defender.  The defendants, were denied, through the pre-trial and the trial, to bring tape recorders into the courtroom, so that we could review events from each days proceedings.  The defendants were also denied the right to have our own COURT REPORTER present.  At a later date, the defendants discovered that the appointed court reporter, Kevin Weichman, was not, or ever had been, a certified court reporter, yet Mr. Weichman was appointed by Judge Glenn A. Norton to record the proceedings.  What’s wrong with this picture?  All of the proceedings which were recorded by Mr. Kevin Weichman, are illegal and in violation of the law.  This is pursuant to Rule 14.07.  Everything in this “dog and pony show trial” was illegal, unconstitutional and fraudulent.  Judge Norton informed the defendants that the defendants, who were representing themselves per se, would be held to the same standards as the experienced states prosecutors, which is in direct violation of the united States Supreme Court ruling which stated that “per se litigants were not to be held to the same standards as experienced trial lawyers.  We the defendants, knew that we were not paragons of legal brilliance or of courtroom procedures, but we knew that we were on target as far as the law was concerned, and we also knew that we were not in a court of law, but in a court of lawbreakers.  We also knew that we were going down the second time, but not one broke and ran or bowed to the tyranny of this “dog and pony show trial” court.

 

     Judge Norton did nothing to protect the defendants God given constitutional rights, but because of his bias, prejudice, vindictiveness and judicial misconduct, knowing full well that the petitions and motions that were presented by the defendants, were lawfully correct, but did nothing to honor his Canons and his Oath of Affirmation.  The defendants petitioned Judge Norton to prove to the defendants, that he indeed, had filed and recorded his Oath of Affirmation.  Judge Norton not only vehemently refused to honor the request of the defendants, but continued his relentless onslaught on these defendants rights and the integrity of not only the court, but the entire legal and judicial process.

 

     The defendants were held up to not only blatant abuse by the court and the prosecution, by being insulted and vilified, as though we were the scum of the earth.  Anyone watching these proceedings would have to have been blind and deaf, not to see and understand what was taking place.  It was evident that the court and prosecution were in collusion, because Judge Norton did nothing to preserve the integrity of the court or to censure the prosecution for their continued insults against the defendants.

 

     The prosecution constantly, by their suggestive inuendos, tried to implant into the minds of the jurors, the unfounded and unsubstantiated claims, that these defendants were associated with the “Montana Freemen”.  Never did the state present one iota of evidence to back up their accusations or claims against these defendants.  The defendants objected time and time again against these scurrilous remarks by the states prosecutors continued onslaught.  The defendants petitioned Judge Norton to force the states prosecutors to present proof of their claims.  Judge Norton did nothing because, again, he was part of the problem and not the solution.

 

     Every time the defendants objected, they were, overruled by the Judge.  This became an ongoing pattern throughout the trial.  Only a couple of times were the defendants objections sustained, and only a couple of times were the states objections overruled.  The state even tried to get censures imposed upon some of the defendants because of the strenuous objections, and hey succeeded, while the defendants were unsuccessful in their efforts to be heard.

 

     It was obvious that the defendants were being railroaded, and we again realized that we had been tried, convicted and sentenced, even before the “dog and pony show trial” had begun.

 

     The defendants were even restricted by the states prosecutors in their closing statements.  Every time that one of the defendants tried to make a statement that the prosecution didn’t want the jury to hear, and we were ordered to stand down.  How many rules of law, does that infringe upon?

 

     Judge Norton in his instructions to the jury, gave the same instructions as did Judge Fred Rush, by stating again to the jury, “you the jury, will determine the facts, and I will determine the law.

 

 

     The demeanor of the court was set up in the manner that it was, is because Judge Norton refused to grant a change of venue, and stated that the trial “would be held in Lincoln County and nowhere else”.

 

     Another point that the defendants want to bring to light is that Judge Norton threatened the defendants with expulsion from the court proceedings, if the defendants divulged to the jury that we had been tried, convicted and sentenced on the same charges in a previous trial.  What’s wrong with this scenario?

 

     When the verdict was brought in, we knew that, once again we would be railroaded back into prison.

 

     But we were shocked beyond belief when Judge Norton again sentenced Dennis Logan to seven (7) years, which was the maximum, but Judge Norton said that he would have given Mr. Logan much more time if he could have.  The rest of the defendants had their sentences increased from the original two (2) years in the first trial to four (4) in this trial.  The sentence does not conform to NORTH CAROLINA V. PEARCE, which states that “a judge cannot increase a second trial sentence, unless the defendant(s) would have done something between their first and second trial, and for the judge to increase their sentence, he would have to put his reason(s), in writing.  Judge Norton put nothing in writing or even attempted to give a reason.  The defendants believe that is why we were threatened with expulsion from the trial proceedings if we divulged to the jury, of our previous trial and incarceration, so the jury would be tempted to render a lesser sentence, because we had already been punished, far above the guidelines as established by the state, for a first offense.  Judge Norton also said, “that if we again took this to a higher court, and came back to his court, that he would give us six (6) years the next time.  If this statement doesn’t prove, beyond a shadow of a doubt as to the demeanor and state of mind of Judge Glenn A. Norton to prove his bias and vindictiveness and his utter contempt towards these defendants, then these defendants, and the spectators, that were present at this lynching, have had their heads in the sand all of their lives and believe that the moon is made out of green cheese.  This proves, beyond a shadow of a doubt as to how far the courts in Missouri, and the entire united States, are out of control and must be brought into accountability, and those responsible for this travesty, be brought up on charges and be punished to the fullest, which would serve notice on all future courts to “do right”. 

 

 

     Also, Mr. Logan’s bond was increased to $500,00 and the rest to $200,000, for a Class “C: Felony.  Convicted murderers and people that have sold our most sensitive military secrets to foreign power’s, weren’t treated this cruelly.  Again, how much more blatant could this abuse of authority be?  Anyone that would have as much sense that “God gave to a goose” would have seen and understood why these defendants were treated in his manner.  The biggest mistake that the Lincoln County Circuit Court and the states prosecutors made is that they thought that they could sweep us under the rug and that would be an end to their chicanery or legal pettifoggery, and have been living under the delusion that this is a dead issue.  Nobody in this country has ever been more wrong.  Someone, someday, who has the moral turpitude and backbone and possesses the ability and desire to expose this horrendous fraud, will step forward and accept the challenge to right a terrible wrong.  Not only for these defendants but for all of those that have been railroaded into prison through a corrupt and decadent legal system.

 

     The defendants were immediately jailed without the opportunity of being able to try and post bond for an appeal.  This is why the bond was set so high as to prevent the prisoners from securing a bond.  The court and the prosecution wanted these defendants to not only to be put in prison, but to be buried under the prison.  There is no one in the legal or judicial system that could justify this kind of action.  There is nothing in the law or statutes that would come remotely close to making these actions legal.

 

     It should be noted here that 6 of the 14 defendants that started the second trial, secured the services of public defenders or plea bargained on their own to the court and prosecution and received probation.  The eight defendants who did not accept a public defender or plea bargain, do state, here and now, that we would never commit perjury by admitting to something that we were not guilty of.

 

     The eight remaining defendants from the original fifteen, were convicted on June 11, 1999, and were immediately incarcerated in the Lincoln County jail.  Due to the fact that our bonds were set at an unreasonable and unconscionable large amount(one was set at $500,00 and the others were set at $200,000), and it was impossible for these prisoners to even hope to make bond for an appeal.  Anyone with the slightest degree of intelligence, could see that this was a deliberate action, initiated by Judge Norton and the states prosecutors, to make sure that these prisoners would be unable to make an appeal bond, and that these prisoners would be incarcerated until the Missouri Department of Corrections, along with the Missouri Board of Parole and Probation, would release these prisoners, thus insuring that the Lincoln County Court and the Missouri Attorney General, that there would be no way for these prisoners to again, be freed on an appeal bond.

 

    The seven prisoners were taken to the Lincoln County Circuit Court around August 8, 1999, for sentencing.  After the prisoners were sentenced, Judge Norton went into a tirade against the prisoners, by referring to us as a menace to society and that if he could have increased our sentences far beyond what the law allowed, he would do so.  Judge Norton was livid in his tirade.  Again, convicted murderers and people tried for treason against the united States, have not been treated as shabbily as these seven prisoners.  It should be noted here that one of the prisoners, Dorsett Harry Gant was released on probation, due to the fact of his advanced age.  Mr Gant celebrated his 80th birthday while incarcerated in the Lincoln County jail, and could not have survived another tour of duty in the Missouri DOC.

 

     On around August 13, 1999, the prisoners were returned to the DOC camps that they had bonded out of in 1997.

 

     But first, let us go back to June 28, 1999, when the prisoners filed a “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” in the Federal District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, in Saint LouisMissouri.

 

1.    The prisoners were taken into custody late in the afternoon of June 11, 1999, with the amount of bond being raised four to ten times the previous amounts of the 1996 bonds (new bonds were set at $200,000 and $500,000) following a jury verdict on that date.  The jury recommendation of sentencing is less than 15 years down to 4 years), and the verdict was not for a capital crime.  (Bill of Rights 1789-1791, Article the seventh…Excessive bail shall not, be required, or excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted, known today as Amendment VIII.  Article the seventh…No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury,…nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.

2.    These Petitioners allege that the Respondent Sheriff has no lawful authority to hold these Petitioners in jail.  It is further alleged that demand has been made to obtain copy(s) of any commitment orders, and that the single document supplied is NOT a commitment order, which can stand by itself, without other underlying authority.  A note supplied to the petitioners, states in full, “This is all we have at this time”, and signed by a Captain Fox, is an admission of no underlying authority upon which a remand might operate.

3.    These petitioners state that there are no known and effective remedies presently available within Missouri for reasons that:

 

(a)  The common law Writ of Habeas Corpus has been effectively superceded, and suspended in Missouri by fiat of rule making.

 

(1) Constitution of the united States of America, 1787-1789, Article 1, Section 9.

                        

                              

Paragraph 2…”The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be

                       Suspended.     

 

                      (2)   Constitution of Missouri, Article 1, Section 10…That no person shall

                              be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

                              

                              Article 1, Section 12…That the privilege of the writ of habeas

                              Corpus shall never be suspended.

 

            (b) A remedy by appeal is not presently available because these prisoner-petit-

                     ioners have not been sentenced.  Sentencing on August 6, 1999.

               (c)  A remedy by appeal is neither effective nor available to address this present

                      incarceration.  (MORGAN V. STATE (1969) 298 F. Supp. 581…”Where                    

                      there are obstacles in state judicial procedure, working to deny state

                      prisoners his federal right to due process of law, federal courts have no

                      choice but to grant appropriate procedural proceeding such as habeas                        

                      corpus”.

                     .  .

   

(4)      Prior to the initiation of any action later to be styled as STATE OF MISSOURI V. ANDREW CELLA etal., the regularly elected Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln County, State of Missouri, G. John Richards.

    

(a)   Made application for appointment of “Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon, for Special prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln County, State of Missouri.

(b)  An Order of appointment did issue, dated the 5th day of April, 1996, which designated Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon as Special Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Lincoln, State of Missouri.

 

5.   It is clearly demonstrable from the subsequent record that the “Special Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln County, State of Missouri” has NEVER made an APPEARANCE, nor PROSECUTED any portion of the STATE OF MISSOURI V. ANDREW CELLA etal., case.  Nor did the “Special Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln County, Stae of Missouri”, sign the “Complaint” or “Information”.  By default it should be ruled that ALL prior proceedings in the case of STATE OF MISSOURI  V. ANDREW CELLA etal., are a nullity and void.  That the temporary and Special Office of Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln County, State of Missouri, be declared vacant by means of nonfeasance.

 

6.   Because of the absolute lack of the Special Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln County in all of the other prior proceedings, there was a LACK OF JURISDICTION in the trial court for the reason that the plaintiff’s representative, Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon, Special Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln County, State of Missouri, failed to appear and prosecute the action.  And now, after reversal and remand, there is an effort to exhume and breathe a semblance of life into a cadaver, and still without the actual appearance by the “Special Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln County, State of Missouri.

 

7.   These petitioners have notified the trial court of the non-appearance of the “Special Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln County, State of Missouri”, and have demanded that the court should eject the unauthorized lawyers and have entered a continuing objection to the “States” proceedings, but to no avail.  (FAY V. NOLA 91963) 372, US 391, 9 L Ed 837. [6].  Although in form, the Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty.  For its function has been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints.  It’s root principal is that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man’s imprisonment; if the imprisonment cannot to be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release.  Thus there is nothing novel in the fact that today , habeas corpus, in the federal courts, provides a mode for the redress of due process of law.  Vindication of due process is precisely its historic office.

8.   These petitioners allege that the proceedings in the underlying STATE OF MISSOURI V. ANDREW CELLA etal., case, became barred by the statute of Limitations, effective 1 April, 1999, because there never has been a lawful brought by Indictment or by an Information, signed by the prosecuting officer, Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon.

9.   These petitioners allege that “Jurisdiction has never attached to the trial court in Lincoln County, and that after reversal and remand, no jurisdiction exists.

10. These petitioners allege, that the retrial proceedings in the underlying STATE OF MISSOURI V. ANDREW CELLA etal., case, was barred by the “Double Jeopardy clause” of the Constitution of the united States of America, for the reason that in an earlier trial (December 1996 and reversed and remanded in July 1998), the trial jury was instructed to find, and did find a verdict on the basis of “Principal and Accessory”.  The verdict found guilt as accessories, only while the so-claimed Information charged upon a single count alleging, Principal only.  The verdict of guilt as “Accessories” only, was an acquittal, on the alleged “Principal” charge.

11. These petitioners further allege that the procedural mode which had allowed and permitted that Accessories could be charged as Principals, but convicted as Accessories, has been repealed effective 1 January, 1979, and that there is no procedure which allows and permits such a mode, since that date. For this reason, the underlying STATE OF MISSOURI V. ANDREW CELLA etal., case, for the reason that a res Judicata decision acted as a bar to the originating so-called complaint that began the STATE OF MISSOURI V. ANDREW CELLA etal., case.

12. These petitioners allege that the STATE was collaterally estopped from even initiating the underlying STATE OF MISSOURI V. ANDREW CELLA etal., case, for the reason that a res Judicata decision acted as a bar to the originating so-claimed complaint, that began the STATE OF MISSOURI V. ANDREW CELLA etal., case.   

 

A review of Missouri decisions reveal these uncontestable facts>

   

13. It is unconstitutionally mandatory in criminal proceedings that an INDICTMENT or an INFORMATION be filed, and the existence of a formal and valid charging instrument is jurisdictional.  An INDICTMENT or an INFORMATION would have to be signed by the Special Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln County, State of Missouri, Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon.  Such signed document is not found in the court file.  NEVER FILED.

14. decisions have held that Constitutional authority to file Information’s is derived from common law and is limited to an Attorney General (or Solicitor General) or, as adopted to the American systems, the Prosecuting Attorney for the various counties, and in the case of STATE OF MISSOURI V. ANDREW CELLA etal., the Special Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln County, State of Missouri, would have been Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon.  No Information filed by Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon was found in the court files.

15. Because a private citizen is not a prosecuting officer, any paper or document, which purports to be an Information, but signed only by a private citizen (Theodore A. Bruce, Edward R. Ardini Jr.) and presented to a court, a judicial officer or clerk, as an Information, is totally void ab initio.

16. The absence of a signature of the correct and proper prosecuting officer (Special Prosecuting Attorney for Lincoln County, Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon), yields the legal result of NO CHARGES BEFORE THE COURT AND NO JURISDICTION           , THE petitioners should be turned loose.

17. As applied in this case, the alleged Prosecuting Attorney, Jeremiah W. “J:” Nixon has never made an appearance.  The document(s) which purport to be Information’s (there were fifteen “Information’s”, that were not signed by the Special Prosecuting Attorney).  Rather, imposters intruded into the affair and without lawful authority, usurped the designation of “Special Prosecuting Attorney.  By so doing, that imposter may have committed offenses such as “False impersonation” (RSMo Section 575.120) or Perjury (RSMo. Section 575.040).

18. Because the “Information’s” are not signed by a LAWFULLY correct or proper public prosecuting officer ,the Information’s are false and fraudulent documents, which did not, do not and cannot invest a trial court with jurisdiction.

19. Therefore these petitioners believe that the facts included within this application are true and accurate, and that there was o JURISDICTION, and they are being detained UNCONSTITUTIONALLY, and the Writ of Habeas Corpus should issue forthwith.

 

This Writ of Habeas Corpus application to the United States District Court, Eastern District, was denied on September 27th, 2000, for failure to exhaust state remedies.

 

What the federal court failed to understand or to take into consideration is that the State of Missouri, having perpetrated this fraud upon these Petitioners, by denying, repeatedly, Petitions/Motions and other Writs that these Petitioners had submitted to the courts, for a redress of their grievances, had only one way to turn for help and that was the Federal Court.  We were like a ping pong ball in a game of table tennis.  The state courts totally ignored our legal and constitutional prostrations, and when, we were denied, by the state courts, we turned to the Federal Court, but were again denied.  We were in a legal vise because, when this fraud upon the Petitioners is uncovered, there are a lot of people who are going to go down because the courts believed that they could sweep us under the rug, and that we would just go away.  How wrong they are.  We also feel that there was collusion between the state courts and the federal court, to keep the public from finding out just how rotten the legal and court system has become.

 

After the prisoners were transferred from the Lincoln County jail and returned to the Missouri Department of Corrections, a series of Petitions/Notions and Writs were submitted to the Missouri Court of Appeals, the Missouri Supreme Court and the Federal District Court, seeking relief from the illegal and immoral prosecutions that were perpetrated by the Attorney General of the State of Missouri, Jeremiah W. “J” Nixon, the Lincoln County Circuit Court and the Missouri State Highway Patrol.

 

The documents that were submitted by he incarcerated defendants are too numerous to go into in detail, and basically, what were in the documents that were submitted, the information and the charges, were the same as had been previously submitted, so nothing would be gained to go over each document, which are repetitive in nature.

 

In August of 1999, a Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by these Petitioners in the case of State ex rel., Andrew James Cella, etal., Petitioners vs. HABEAS CORPUS, Dora Schriro etal.  Dora Schriro was the Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections, for the September session of the Missouri Supreme Court.  Again, the Petitioners were seeking release from confinement on the grounds that have been enumerated over and over again.  On the 28th day of December, 1999, the Petitioners received a reply from the Missouri Supreme Court.  Their reply was, “Now on this day, on consideration of the petition for writ of habeas corpus herein to the said respondents, it is ordered by the Court here that the said petition be, and the same is hereby denied.  Covington J., not participating”.  This document was signed by the Clerk, Thomas Simon and the Deputy Clerk, Norma Jean Creach.  Again, there was no signature from the Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court, therefore making their decision, null and void on its face.  Missouri Courts and the Missouri Supreme Court cannot even live up to and abide by their own laws, but how many thousands and thousands of Missouri citizens have been incarcerated for, supposedly breaking the law? What’s wrong with this picture?

 

In August of 2000 a “Petition/Motion For Rehearing of Appeal” was filed in the Missouri Supreme Court by these Appellant’s

 

This was a 39 page document and basically was again a compilation of the facts that have been brought out time and time again.  We never really expected a fair and honest decision to be handed down by the Missouri Supreme Court, because of previous inane and inept decisions.  We expected them to put their heads in a noose, which they did.  After a period of time when we realized that we were riding a dead horse we continued filing documents in the various courts for the sole purpose of having a paper trail to back up our case against the Lincoln County Circuit Court, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, The Missouri Supreme Court and the Federal District Court, who did not remotely think or believe that these Christian constitutionalists were not going to roll over and play dead and would not accept being swept under the rug.

 

On March 28, 2000, the defendants filed a “PETITION OF NEW FOUND EVIDENCE FOR REVERSAL AND DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE”, in the Missouri Supreme Court, yet in the reply that these Appellant’s received from the “Motion/Petition Rehearing of Appeal in the Missouri Supreme Court” En Banc’s PER CURIAM reply, they alluded to the fact that in the “New Evidence Petition/Motion, the Appellant’s stressed the fact that none of the participating parties in any of the court proceedings had filed or recorde their “Oaths of Affirmation”, which would have made everything that was precipitated against these common law advocates, illegal and unconstitutional.

           The Supreme Court stated that “Such evidence does not constitute newly found discovered evidence as it could have been discovered before trial and there is no apparent reason why the evidence claimed to be newly “found” could not have been discovered prior to trial.  Yet, the United States Supreme Court held that per se litigants were not to be held to the same standards as experienced lawyers, so then why, did the Missouri Supreme Court insist that the law be adhered to strictly, even though the Appellant’s claim was untimely, knowing full well that anyone taking the Oath of Affirmation must file and record said Oath’s with the Secretary of State, or forfeit their positions.  Even though our “New Found” evidence was untimely, the Missouri Supreme Court, knowing full well that our claim was legitimate, and knowing that the Judges and states prosecutors were in contravention to the law, still allowed this travesty to continue.  Could this be because some of the Missouri Supreme Court Judges also, do not have their Oath of Affirmation filed and recorded?  Another case, of the “good old boys” protecting, the “good old boys”.  Double standard on its face.  The Missouri Supreme Court cited the fact that there was no transcript, even though they had been informed that Judge Glenn Norton failed to protect the courts records by allowing an uncertified court reporter to record the proceedings. The recordings of the court reporter, Kevin Weichman, were not legal or useable because he was not a certified court reporter.  Judge Norton knew this and so did the Missouri Supreme Court, yet the Appellant’s were admonished because we didn’t submit a transcript.  Whats wring with this scenario?

 

    The time is long past for this horrendous miscarriage of justice to be brought to light and the citizens of Missouri learn exactly what is going on in the legal and judicial system, and the perpetrators of this fraud, brought to justice and exposed for what they are, frauds, and in the usurpation of their authority, have committed treason against not only the Constitution of the united States of America but also against the state of Missouri.

____________________________________________________________________________

4 13 2012   ©

Hi Mel

    I was able to listen to the report that Keith made and it hit on most everything.  There ae a lot of other frauds perpetrated by the Attorney General’s office of Missouri and Lincoln County.  One thing that Keith was wrong on was that Detmer, Lenk and Castle were tried in Clayton, Missouri and not St. Charles. Those three was convicted and given suspended sentences and I believe around 200 hours of community service.  One point that Keith brought out was that our first trial transcript was 3200 pages long and a person would have to be a complete idiot not to recognize that this dicument was edited and that is why it took Lincoln County 10 months to enable us to read it.  Also I was glad that Keith brought out the fact that we were not allowed to have our own Court reporter and that is why we couldn’t get any action from the Missouri Supreme court because we didn’t have a certified record to present.  They covered their butts pretty good but all of their chicanery will not do them any good because when this all breaks, they will be held accountable for their actions.  The uncertified court reporter in our first trial was a person by the name of Weichman.  I don’t remember his first name. Another thing is that we have certified copies of every document that we filed in Lincoln County so here is noway that they can lie their way out of this.  I hope you enjoyed reading this information.  Have a nice day.

 

 

 

Note: Doctrine of RES JUDICATA “the thing has been decided” Public Administrative Notice,  Nunc Pro Tunc Notice to the Principle is Notice to the agent any information on this web site, attachments, emails, that you believe may be in error, misleading, or illegal or un lawful,or  as a potential violation of the law,I am giving you notice and I am offering the administrative remedy of identifying to me this information and the laws that may be violated, so I can immediately correct any errors.It is not the intent of this web site to misinform or mislead any woman, man, corporate agency, civil servant, I am offering this administrative remedy to all in order that there never be a need for any “legal remedy”

for removal from my list /email, please reply with remove in the subject line   206.338.5964

 © BY: cella, and all   ©

                              

THE MISSOURI FIFTEEN  

 INTRODUCTION

freeconferencecalling.com/ Recordings/Recording.aspx?fileid=MN3488_04112012180452150_1083364&bridge=464340&email=&accountid=464340

       The following is a true and accurate account of events that began in Missouri and Illinois on June 17, 1996.

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